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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2009, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (3): 72-80.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

不完全信息下再制造逆向供应链的定价与协调研究

李枫, 孙浩, 达庆利   

  1. 东南大学经济管理学院, 江苏南京 210096
  • 收稿日期:2008-06-26 修回日期:2009-05-15 出版日期:2009-06-30 发布日期:2009-06-30
  • 作者简介:李枫(1984- ),女(汉族),山东人,东南大学经济管理学院硕士研究生,研究方向:供应链管理.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772059)

Study on the Pricing and Coordinating Mechanism with Incomplete Information in Remanufacturing Reverse Supply Chain

LI Feng, SUN Hao, DA Qing-li   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
  • Received:2008-06-26 Revised:2009-05-15 Online:2009-06-30 Published:2009-06-30

PDF (PC)

1228

被引次数

162

摘要： 本文探讨了回收量随机情况下的单一制造商和两个零售商组成的再制造逆向供应链系统的定价策略。在完全信息下,分别得到了Stackelberg博弈和联合博弈下的可行策略集合及可行解。在不完全信息下,运用信号甄别方法及激励相容约束得到了两个最优定价合同。研究表明:定价合同可以有效避免逆向选择问题,保证回收市场的稳定性;通过签订合同,制造商和零售商的利润均有所增加;制造商可通过零售商的履约表现控制其回收量,并对未完成任务的零售商进行惩罚;高运营成本零售商会不断降低运营成本以增加利润。

关键词: 逆向供应链, 定价, stackelberg博弈, 信号博弈

Abstract: This paper discusses pricing strategies of aremanufacturing reverse supply chain consistod of one manufacturer and two retailers with random collection quantity. Feasible solutions and strategy sets are obtained under Stackelberg game and cooperative game with complete information; Then two optimal pricing contracts are achieved by signal screening method and incentive compatibility constraints with incomplete information. The research shows that the contract could avoid adverse selection effectively and make the market stable. Both the manufacturer and the retailers can earn more profits under the contracts. The manufacturer can control collection quantity by observing retailers. performance and punish the retailer who fails to finish the collection task. The retailer with higher-cost prefers to reduce the cost and gain more profit.

Key words: reverse supply chain, pricing, Stackelberg game, signal game

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