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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2009, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (1): 83-88.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

工程项目采购供应链中的竞合博弈

许婷   

  1. 南京财经大学会计学院, 江苏 南京 210046
  • 收稿日期:2008-10-31 修回日期:2009-01-07 出版日期:2009-02-28 发布日期:2009-02-28
  • 作者简介:许婷(1981- ),女(汉族),安徽舒城人,南京财经大学会计学院,讲师,博士,研究方向:工程管理,博弈理论与方法.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70731002);“十一五”国家科技支撑计划项目子课题(2006BAG04B06)

Co-Opetition Game of Supply Chain in Engineering Procurement

XU Ting   

  1. School of Accounting, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 210046, China
  • Received:2008-10-31 Revised:2009-01-07 Online:2009-02-28 Published:2009-02-28

PDF (PC)

2048

被引次数

88

摘要： 供应商、承包商与业主构成了工程项目采购中的供应链,在长期的工程建设与采购中,业主与承包商具有合作的动机.文章基于演化博弈论的方法,研究了工程采购中业主与承包商合作的演化方向及影响因素,研究表明:在非契约条件下,双方合作的概率与合作的超额收益呈正向关系,与合作成本及背叛收益呈反向关系,而为合作超额收益制定合理的分配系数是双方持续合作的必要条件;在签订了联盟合同后,背叛将受到惩罚,此时双方演化的结果将是均选择合作策略.

关键词: 工程采购, 供应链, 竞合, 演化博弈

Abstract: The supplier, contractor and client constitute a supply chain in engineering procurement.Through long-term construction and purchase, the client and the contractor have the motivation of cooperanon.Based on evolutionary game theory, the paper studies the evolutionary direction of co-opetition between client and contractor, and analyzes the influencing factors.The result shows that the probability of cooperation of both sides has a positive correlation with excess return and a negative correlation with cost of cooperation and betrayal income.Reasonable partition coefficient to distribute the excess return is a necessary condition for both sides' sustained cooperation.In the case of an alliance contract, betrayal will be punished, and cooperation of both sides will be the evolutionary direction.

Key words: engineering procurement, supply chain, co-opetition, evolutionary game

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