主管：中国科学院
主办：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
　　　中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院
中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2007, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (1): 99-105.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

信号成本与服务外包供应商信号传递关系的博弈模型

梁建英1,2, 李垣1, 廖貅武1   

  1. 1. 西安交通大学管理学院, 陕西西安710049;
    2. 河北经贸大学数学与统计学院, 河北石家庄050091
  • 收稿日期:2006-04-21 修回日期:2007-01-10 出版日期:2007-02-28 发布日期:2007-02-28
  • 作者简介:梁建英(1966- ),男(汉族),西安交通大学管理学院博士生,河北经贸大学副教授,研究方向:战略联盟、IT外包.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目(70072022,70571063)

A Game Model on the Relations between Signal Cost and Outsourcing Vendor Signaling

LIANG Jian-ying1,2, LI Yuan1, LIAO Xiu-wu1   

  1. 1. School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, China;
    2. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Hebei Economy and Trade University, Shijiazhuang 050091, China
  • Received:2006-04-21 Revised:2007-01-10 Online:2007-02-28 Published:2007-02-28

PDF (PC)

2128

被引次数

70

摘要： 由于服务外包市场的信息不对称性和不完美性,外包商难以清楚了解供应商的能力,使得服务外包供应商选择市场出现逆向选择。为解决非对称信息条件下服务外包供应商选择市场运行的低效问题,本文利用信号博弈建立了信号成本与外包供应商信号传递关系的数学模型,并通过案例分析说明了该模型对管理的指导意义。

关键词: 非对称信息, 逆向选择, 信号博弈, 供应商选择

Abstract: Because of asymmetric information and imperfect information,it is difficult for outsourcer to clarify the ability of the vendor which usually results in adverse selection. To solve such a problem,a model for analyzing the impacts of asymmetric information on vendor selection is proposed. Furthermore,the condition for market success is given based on the signal cost of vendor and the belief of outsourcer in this paper. At last,a case analysis is presented to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the model on management significance.

Key words: asymmetric information, adverse selection, game, vendor selection

中图分类号: