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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2007, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (1): 136-141.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于选拔机制的国企经营者行为的博弈分析

方涌, 蒲勇健   

  1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆400030
  • 收稿日期:2005-10-19 修回日期:2007-01-15 出版日期:2007-02-28 发布日期:2007-02-28
  • 作者简介:方涌(1976- ),男(汉族),浙江杭州人,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院博士研究生,研究方向:博弈论与信息经济学.
  • 基金资助:

    教育部人文社会科学基金项目(02JA790062)

Game Analysis of Managers’ Behavior in China’s State-Owned Enterprises, Based on Selecting-Mechanism

FANG Yong, PU Yong-jian   

  1. College of Economy and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China
  • Received:2005-10-19 Revised:2007-01-15 Online:2007-02-28 Published:2007-02-28

PDF (PC)

938

被引次数

15

摘要： 本文从国有企业现有的选拔机制和激励机制出发,探讨了国企经营者在利润报告上的行为选择问题。博弈分析发现选拔机制将导致激励机制难以发挥作用,即使将经营者收入与报告利润挂钩也难以阻止经营者的作假行为。存在着经营者为自身地位而低报利润的可能,且当社会普遍认为国有企业效益不佳时,其造假的可能性也更大。

关键词: 国有企业, 选拔机制, 不完全信息动态博弈

Abstract: This paper discusses managers'behaviors on profit reporting,based on the exiting manager-select and incentive mechanisms of state-owned enterprises in China.Equilibriums of game show that the selecting mechanism will make the incentive ones difficult to play its roles,and false accounts can't be stopped even manager's income are hooked on the book profit.Managers may disguise profitin order to protect their position.When low benefitin state-owned enterprises is generally recognized,they are more likely to make a cheat.

Key words: state-owned enterprise, selecting-mechanism, dynamic game of incomplete information

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