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主办：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2007, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (4): 70-76.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

供应链不同合作模式下合作利益分配机制研究——以煤电企业供应链为例

赵晓丽1,2, 乞建勋1   

  1. 1. 华北电力大学工商管理学院, 北京 102206;
    2. 中国人民大学商学院, 北京 100872
  • 收稿日期:2006-09-22 修回日期:2007-07-05 出版日期:2007-08-31 发布日期:2007-08-31
  • 作者简介:赵晓丽(1970- ),女(汉族),黑龙江双城人,华北电力大学工商管理学院金融与国际贸易系主任,副教授,研究方向:贸易经济与产业发展、能源经济

Distribution of Cooperation Benefits under Different Supply Chains——The Case of Coal and Eletric Power Enterprises

ZHAO Xiao-li1,2, QI Jian-xun1   

  1. 1. School of Management North-China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China;
    2. Business School, Ren min University of China, Beijing 100872, China
  • Received:2006-09-22 Revised:2007-07-05 Online:2007-08-31 Published:2007-08-31

PDF (PC)

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摘要： 供应链合作模式直接决定合作利益形成机理,并由此影响合作利益分配,针对不同合作模式研究合作利益分配机制十分必要。根据煤电企业供应链合作实际,运用无限阶段讨价还价博弈方法建立了基于利润分配因子的合作利益分配模型,该模型适合一方向另一方投资的合作利益分配;运用Shapley值法和风险期望原理,建立了基于合作贡献和风险补偿原则确定的合作利益分配模型,该模型适合对长期合同、战略合作等合作利益分配。本文研究结果不仅对煤电企业,而且对其他生产商与供应商之间的供应链合作利益分配机制的建立具有指导意义。

关键词: 供应链合作, 合作利益分配, 讨价还价博弈, Shapley值, 风险期望

Abstract: The form of supply chain cooperation affects the engendering mechanism and distribution of cooperation benefits.Therefore,it is necessary to study the distribution of cooperation benefits under different cooperation forms Based on supply chain cooperation between coal and electricity power enterprises,we use the infinite stage bargaining game to model the distribution of cooperation benefits,with the profit allocation factor taken into consideration.This is applicable to cases where one party invests in the other.Further,we employ Shapley Value method and the expectation theory to model the distribution of cooperation benefits according to contribution to cooperation and the tradeoff between risks and rewards.This applies to long-term contracts and strategic cooperation.Our analysis has implications for the distribution mechanism of cooperation benefits between producers and suppliers.

Key words: supply chain cooperation, distribution of cooperation benefits, bargaining game, shapley value risk expectation

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