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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2009, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (6): 91-97.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

武器装备保障供应链中基于绩效的整体外包机制

刘丽文, 郭祥雷   

  1. 清华大学经济管理学院, 北京 100084
  • 收稿日期:2008-11-13 修回日期:2009-10-20 出版日期:2009-12-30 发布日期:2009-12-30
  • 作者简介:刘丽文(1955- ), 女(汉族), 山西人, 清华大学经济管理学院, 教授, 博士生导师, 研究方向:供应链管理、运营战略、物流管理、服务管理.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972030, 70532004)

Performance Based Entire Outsourcing Mechanism in Weaponry Support Supply Chain

LIU Li-wen, GUO Xiang-lei   

  1. School of Economics & management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
  • Received:2008-11-13 Revised:2009-10-20 Online:2009-12-30 Published:2009-12-30

PDF (PC)

1271

被引次数

12

摘要： 传统的武器装备保障是军方体制内的保障,供应商只负责提供装备,因而供应商没有动力提高装备可靠性,保障成本也比较高.针对这种弊端,本文提出了一种基于绩效的保障服务整体外包模式,即由供应商负责从提供装备到完成装备保障任务的整个供应链,军方根据保障的绩效水平通过合同进行一定的奖励和惩罚.本文运用委托代理的研究模型,分析了这种保障模式的优势.结果表明,军方一定的激励政策可以引导供应商努力提高装备可靠性,并使其获得更好的收入;与此同时,军方保障的总成本也得到降低,供应链绩效得到改善.

关键词: 武器装备保障, 服务外包, 委托代理, 备件库存

Abstract: The traditional weaponry support function is performed within the military system.Suppliers only provide weapons, thus they have no motive to improve the weaponry reliability.The cost of weaponry support is high.To solve this problem, we bring forward a new mechanism of the entire supply outsourcing based on the performance.The suppliers are responsible for the whole supply chain tasks from providing weapons to weaponry support.The military gives rewards or punishments according to the suppliers' performance.The advantages of this kind of mechanism are analyzed through a principal-agent model.The results show that the military can use certain incentive policies to induce the suppliers to improve the weaponry reliability and meanwhile enhance their incomes.The total cost of the military's weaponry supports al so can be reduced, and the performance of the whole supply chain is improved.

Key words: weaponry support, service outsourcing, principal-agent, service parts inventory

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