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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2010, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (2): 157-164.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

政府管制与双寡头企业社会责任行为的博弈研究

宁亚春1, 罗之仁2   

  1. 1. 湖南大学工商管理学院, 湖南长沙410012;
    2. 湖南涉外经济学院, 湖南长沙410205
  • 收稿日期:2009-07-01 修回日期:2010-03-24 出版日期:2010-04-30 发布日期:2010-04-30
  • 作者简介:宁亚春(1975- ),男(汉族),湖南株洲人,湖南大学工商管理学院,博士生,研究方向:企业管理与伦理决策.
  • 基金资助:

    教育部博士点基金资助项目(20060532021)

Game Research on Government Regulation and Corporate Social Responsibility in Duopoly Market

NING Ya-chun1, LUO Zhi-ren2   

  1. 1. School of Industrial and Business Administration, Hunan University, Changsha 410012, China;
    2. Hunan International Economics University, Changsha 410205, China
  • Received:2009-07-01 Revised:2010-03-24 Online:2010-04-30 Published:2010-04-30

PDF (PC)

1224

被引次数

27

摘要： 企业不负责任行为同时受到政府管制和产品竞争的双重约束。本文构建了政府与双寡头企业的三阶段博弈模型,分析了政府偏好和政府执行力与政府治理企业不负责任行为的政策的关系,揭示了其中所蕴含的"政府偏好悖论"。研究表明:政府惩治企业不负责任行为的关键,是让企业从不负责任行为中所失大于所得;无论政府的偏好如何,都有可能放松对企业不负责任行为的管制,而且政府越偏好短期社会利益,就越不可能将不负责任的企业清除出市场;政府治理不负责任企业的矛盾心理,根源于企业不负责任行为的两面性。

关键词: 政府治理, 企业社会责任, Cournot模型

Abstract: Irresponsible corporate behaviors are constrained by both government regulation and product competition. This article builds a three-stage game model,analyzes the impact of government preference and execution on government regulation of irresponsible corporate behaviors,and reveals the paradox of government preference. Research shows that the key for a government to constrain irresponsible corporate behaviors effectively,is to make corporate losses from irresponsible behaviors exceed gains from those;no matter how the government prefers social interests,there exists a possibility that the government deregulates irresponsible corporate behaviors;the more the government prefers the social interests,the less a possibility of eliminating an irresponsible corporation from the market is;and,the paradox of government preference results from the duality of irresponsible corporate behaviors.

Key words: government regulation, CSR, Cournot model

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