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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2010, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (3): 132-140.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于第二价格预拍的竞标者合谋均衡分析

王宏, 陈宏民, 顾巧明   

  1. 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院, 上海200052
  • 收稿日期:2009-09-02 修回日期:2010-05-16 出版日期:2010-06-30 发布日期:2010-06-30
  • 作者简介:王宏(1981- ),男(汉族),湖北黄梅人,上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院博士生,研究方向:拍卖与机制设计.

Equilibrium Analysis of Bidder Collusion Based on the Second-price Pre-auction Knockout

WANG Hong, CHEN Hong-min, GU Qiao-ming   

  1. Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200052, China
  • Received:2009-09-02 Revised:2010-05-16 Online:2010-06-30 Published:2010-06-30

PDF (PC)

1465

被引次数

14

摘要： 本文假设合谋竞标者在拍卖之前采用第二价格预拍的合谋机制,求解了第一价格拍卖下的合谋均衡。我们不但考虑了拍卖方对于合谋的最优策略性响应,而且考虑了参与合谋的竞标者与没有参与合谋的竞标者之间的策略性响应,研究表明没有参与合谋的竞标者为了抵消合谋竞标者对于自己的不利影响,在竞价时考虑到合谋的存在会比不存在合谋条件下的竞价更具有进取性,而且拍卖方合理的设定保留价格对于合谋的难易有重要影响。

关键词: 第二价格预拍, 竞标者合谋, 保留价格

Abstract: This paper assumes that the collusive bidders take advantage of the second-price pre-auction knockout collusive mechanism,and solves the collusion equilibrium under the first price main auction.We not only consider the auctioneers strategic response to collusion,but also consider the strategic responses between collusive bidders and non-collusive bidders.The main result shows that,compared to competitive biddings without collusions,the bidding of non-cartel members will become more aggressive to counteract disadvantage from cartel members.Furthermore,setting a reasonable reserve price by the auctioneer has significant effect on bidder collusion.

Key words: the second-price pre-auction knockout, bidder cllusion, reserve price

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