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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2011, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (1): 48-54.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于制造商和零售商自有品牌竞争的供应链广告决策

吕芹1, 霍佳震2   

  1. 1. 上海大学悉尼工商学院 上海 201800;
    2. 同济大学经济与管理学院 上海 200092
  • 收稿日期:2010-09-09 修回日期:2011-01-15 出版日期:2011-02-28 发布日期:2011-02-28
  • 作者简介:吕芹(1980- ),女(汉族),安徽宿州人,上海大学悉尼工商学院讲师,研究方向:物流与供应链管理.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金重点项目(70832005);上海市重点学科建设项目(B310)

Supply Chain Advertising Decision Based on Competition of National and Store Brands

LV Qin1, HUO Jia-zhen2   

  1. 1. Sydney Institute of Language and Commerce, Shanghai University, Shanghai 201800, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China
  • Received:2010-09-09 Revised:2011-01-15 Online:2011-02-28 Published:2011-02-28

PDF (PC)

1479

被引次数

75

摘要： 考虑一个零售商同时出售制造商品牌产品和零售商自有品牌产品的营销渠道,这两类产品之间存在一定竞争性。制造商与零售商分别进行广告投资促销并累计商誉,且制造商与零售商共同分担零售商的广告投资成本。假设零售商广告促销活动对制造商品牌商誉存在负面影响。运用微分对策的方法求解动态环境下Stackel-berg主从博弈下的最优决策,并分析了零售商和制造商处参数对决策的影响。最后证明,Stackelberg主从博弈决策优于Nash非合作博弈决策。

关键词: 供应链, Stackelberg博弈, 微分对策, 零售商自有品牌, 合作广告

Abstract: A marketing channel, where a retailer sells, its own store brand, along the manufacturer's brand, is considered.Competition exists between them.Each player invests in advertising in order to build the brand's goodwill, and the manufacturer bears part of the retailer's advertising investment We assume that the retailer's advertising promotion has a negative impact on the goodwill of manufacturer's brand A methodology of differential games is adopted to investigate the optimal advertising strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer in Stackelberg leacler-follower game under a dynamic circumstance.The effect of the parameters of the manufacturer and the retailer on the optimal decision is analyzed.Finally, we prove that the decision of Stackelberg leacler-follower game is prior to the one of Nash non-cooperative game.

Key words: supply chain, Stackelberg game, differential game, store brand, cooperative advertising

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