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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2011, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (2): 155-160.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

复杂产品系统合作创新契约模型有效性研究

宋砚秋1, 贾传亮1, 高天辉2   

  1. 1. 中央财经大学管理科学与工程学院, 北京 100081;
    2. 大连理工大学管理学院, 辽宁大连 116024
  • 收稿日期:2010-06-30 修回日期:2011-01-10 出版日期:2011-04-30 发布日期:2011-04-30
  • 作者简介:宋砚秋(1980- ),女(汉族),辽宁大连人,中央财经大学管理科学与工程学院,讲师,研究方向:项目管理。
  • 基金资助:

    中央财经大学“211工程”三期重点学科建设项目;“中财121人才工程”青年博士发展基金(QBJGL201009)

Study on the Effectiveness of Contract Model on Cooperative Innovation in Complex Product System

SONG Yan-qiu1, JIA Chuan-liang1, GAO Tian-hui2   

  1. 1. Science and Engineering, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China;
    2. School of Management, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China
  • Received:2010-06-30 Revised:2011-01-10 Online:2011-04-30 Published:2011-04-30

PDF (PC)

1181

被引次数

17

摘要： 合作创新是复杂产品系统模块化生产的重要手段,但模块研制中的利益外部性和隐藏检查行为使合作单位易发生道德风险损害项目效益。通过不完全契约激励模型的构建和分析,对模块分包模式和联合研制模式契约模型在合作单位激励约束机制上的有效性进行了探讨。研究表明,模块分包模式中合作单位不承担系统集成风险,因此惩罚金和完全竞争不能抑制道德风险的发生;而联合研制模式使利益外部性内部化,从而避免合作单位道德风险的发生,保证了合作创新的有效性。

关键词: 复杂产品系统, 合作创新, 利益外部性, 道德风险

Abstract: Cooperative innovation is the key method for modular manufacturing of Complex Product System (Short for CoPS).However,there could be moral hazard by cooperative units that will damage project value on the process of modular research ascribe to payoff externality and private monitoring.Based on the constructing and analyzing of incomplete contract incentive model,this paper explors the motivating restriction mechanism effectiveness for cooperative units in module outsourcing and jointly developing.It states that in module outsourcing model,the cooperative units do not have to undertake systematic integrated risk so punishment and complete competing couldn't inhibit moral hazard.What's more,jointly developing model may internalize payoff externality to guarantee the effectiveness of cooperative innovation in order to avoid the risk mentioned above.

Key words: Complex Product System(CoPS), cooperative innovation, payoff externality, moral hazard

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