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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2011, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (3): 79-87.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

一类污水处理项目的运营与排污者行为动态分析

刘小峰1,2, 程书萍1,2, 盛昭瀚2,3, 徐峰2,3   

  1. 1. 南京财经大学, 江苏南京210046;
    2. 南京大学工程管理学院, 江苏南京210029;
    3. 南京大学社会科学计算实验中心, 江苏南京210093
  • 收稿日期:2010-04-27 修回日期:2011-05-06 出版日期:2011-06-30 发布日期:2011-06-30
  • 作者简介:刘小峰(1983- ),男(汉族),江西瑞金人,南京大学工程管理学院博士,研究方向:水环境项目管理、社会经济环境系统演化及计算实验.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然基金重点项目(70731002);自然基金重点项目(70971061,71071073);高校博士点基金(20090091110001)

Dynamic Analysis on a Type of Sewage Treatment Projects Operation and Polluters Behavior

LIU Xiao-feng1,2, CHENG Shu-ping1,2, SHENG Zhao-han2,3, Xu Feng2,3   

  1. 1. Nanjing Vniversity of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 210046, China;
    2. School of Management and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210029, China;
    3. Computational Experiment Center for Social Science, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China
  • Received:2010-04-27 Revised:2011-05-06 Online:2011-06-30 Published:2011-06-30

PDF (PC)

1318

被引次数

19

摘要： 本文针对污水处理项目运营风险高、企业偷排行为控制难问题,首先依据排污信息和排污价格的波动与否,构建了4种计算实验情景;然后针对各种情景分别设计了污水处理价格形成机制、居民和企业社会属性与行为的变化规则,分析了经济压力、社会影响以及政府监管对排污价格形成、排污者行为变化的影响;最后运用计算实验方法模拟了污水处理项目运营与排污者行为在4种情景下的动态变化。结果表明:合理的静态定价策略要优于运营商动态定价策略;动态外部环境既给污水处理项目的运营带来风险,又给政府对企业的监管带来不便;单纯的市场价格机制或政府监管机制很难有效控制偷排现象,也不一定能实现居民的节水减排,企业和运营商的逐利行为可能会使得目标落空。

关键词: 污水处理项目, 计算实验, 排污行为, 容忍度

Abstract: Aiming at the high-risk of sewage treatment projects operation and the difficulty of control illegal emission,four kinds of computational experiment scenarios are constructed based on whether fluctuations between discharge information and sewage disposal price or not.Then the mechanism of formation of pollution charge,polluters.behaviors,government regulation and public restriction are built,simult aneity, some indexes,such as to lerance degree,demand elasticity,are chosen to analysis the changes of behaviors and nature of enterprises or residences under the triple restriction from economic pressure,social influence and governmental regulation.Finally,computational experiment is used to simulate the dynamic changing of sewage treatment project operation and polluters.behavior in four kinds of situations.The result shows that reasonable static pricing strategy superior to dynamic operator-leading pricing strategy,dynamic external environment lead to high risk for both sewage treatment project operation and illegal emission control,neither pure market-driven pricing regimenor governmental regulation can preventillegal emission or improve residents to save water and reduce emission,the profi-tpur suiting nature of firms and operators will fail to fulfill the objective.

Key words: sewage treatment projects, computational experiment, polluters behavior, tolerance degree

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