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中国管理科学

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免费搭车行为对供应链横向竞争的影响

禹爱民, 刘丽文   

  1. 清华大学经济管理学院, 北京 100084
  • 收稿日期:2009-09-03 修回日期:2011-06-29 出版日期:2011-10-30 发布日期:2011-10-30
  • 作者简介:禹爱民(1982- ),男(汉族),湖南人,清华大学经济管理学院博士研究生,研究方向:物流与供应链管理
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972030,7053204)

Study the Free Free-riding Riding’s Impact on Horizontal Competition for Two Retailers

YU Ai-min, LIU Li-wen   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
  • Received:2009-09-03 Revised:2011-06-29 Online:2011-10-30 Published:2011-10-30

PDF (PC)

1965

被引次数

27

摘要： 考虑两家处于供应链下游的零售商,其中一家为实体店,一家为网上店,其中网上店利用了顾客的免费搭车行为获得部分市场需求。文章研究了免费搭车行为对两零售商价格竞争及利润的影响。研究表明随着实体店服务水平的上升和网上店初始需求的增大,网上店的均衡利润将增加,两家店的价格竞争将更加激烈;当边际服务成本较低时,实体店的均衡利润要高于网上店的均衡利润,允许顾客的免费搭车行为存在,并缓解了两家店之间的价格竞争;当边际服务成本很高时,实体店入不敷出,不再允许顾客的免费搭车行为。

关键词: 免费搭车, 供应链, 横向竞争

Abstract: The paper studies two retailers in a supply chain,in which one retailer makes use of free-riding to get part of the demand.The paper studies the impact of free-riding on horizontal price competition.The results show that the equilibrium profit of the online channel will increase and the price competition gets intense when the service level of the retail channel and the original demand of the online channel gets up.What's more,when the margin cost of promotion is low,the equilibrium profit of the retail channel is higher than the online channel and free-riding will exist,which will soften the competition between two channels; when the margin cost of promotion is high,the retail channel can't get profit from promotion,so she will not promote by providing service and free-riding will not exist in this situation.

Key words: free-riding, supply chain, horizontal competition

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