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中国管理科学

中国管理科学

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基于价值创造和动态基础薪酬的经营者激励机制研究

孙世敏, 王昂, 贾建锋   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院, 辽宁 沈阳 110004
  • 收稿日期:2010-07-19 修回日期:2011-07-18 出版日期:2011-10-30 发布日期:2011-10-30
  • 作者简介:孙世敏(1966- ),女(汉族),辽宁瓦房店人,东北大学工商管理学院副教授,管理学博士,研究方向:业绩评价与激励机制
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072122,70902064);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20100471459)

Research on Managers’ Incentive Mechanism Based on Value Creation and Dynamic Basis Compensation

SUN Shi-min, WANG Ang, JIA Jian-feng   

  1. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
  • Received:2010-07-19 Revised:2011-07-18 Online:2011-10-30 Published:2011-10-30

PDF (PC)

2262

被引次数

24

摘要： 目前,经营者激励机制研究通常以净收益为业绩标准,采用固定基础薪酬制度,且大多数局限于薪酬激励。本文以价值创造为业绩标准,采用动态基础薪酬制度,将薪酬激励与非薪酬激励相结合设计经营者激励模型,在传统委托代理模型基础上得出如下三点结论:第一,实行动态基础薪酬制度可以有效提升经营者努力水平;第二,经营者激励应采用薪酬激励与非薪酬激励相结合的手段,并依据非薪酬激励敏感度灵活设计二者的组合比例;第三,垄断行业经营者努力水平低于竞争性行业,需要引入竞争机制。

关键词: 经营者, 激励机制, 价值创造, 动态基础薪酬

Abstract: Nowadays,research on managers' incentive mechanism usually takes net profit as performance standard,applies the system of fixed basis compensation and mostly confines to salary incentive.This paper regards value creation as performance standard,integrates salary and non-salary incentive into managers' incentive model with dynamic basis compensation system and has three conclusions beyond principle-agent model: firstly,the system of dynamic basis compensation may increase manager's effort level; Secondly,the means of salary and non-salary incentive's combination should be adopted in manager's incentive and the flexible assembled proportion of salary and non-salary incentive should be designed by non-salary incentive sensitivity; Thirdly,managers in monopoly industries make less effort than ones in competitive industries,so it is necessary to introduce competitive mechanism.

Key words: managers, incentive mechanism, value creation, dynamic basis compensation

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