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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2009, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (6): 44-50.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

股权对价博弈模型的研究

吴斌1, 李春年2, 何建敏1   

  1. 1. 东南大学经济管理学院, 江苏 南京 210096;
    2. 华泰证券有限责任江苏公司, 江苏 南京 224200
  • 收稿日期:2008-02-13 修回日期:2009-09-24 出版日期:2009-12-30 发布日期:2009-12-30
  • 作者简介:吴斌(1965- ), 男(汉族), 江西吉安人, 东南大学经济管理学院, 副教授, 博士, 研究方向:财务管理、税收经济.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70771026)

An Investigation about the Game of the Consideration

WU Bin1, LI Chun-nian2, HE Jian-min1   

  1. 1. School of Economics & Management, South East University, Nanjing 210096, China;
    2. Huatai Securities CO. LTD, Nanjing 224200, China
  • Received:2008-02-13 Revised:2009-09-24 Online:2009-12-30 Published:2009-12-30

PDF (PC)

1121

被引次数

10

摘要： 股权分置改革对价的核心是确定非流通股股东对流通股股东的补偿.论文通过建立股权对价模型讨论了无时间限制和有时间限制股权分置对价问题.研究显示:流通股和非流通股东对价博弈结果取决于的双方贴现因子的之比.政府的监督和时间限制条件的引入使非流通股股东的成本加大,从而使最终的股权补偿方案只能在一定的范围内实施,补偿范围由是非流通股股东提案成本,博弈次数,惩罚成本确定的函数.

关键词: 股权分置, 讨价还价, 对价, 博弈

Abstract: The core of consideration in the share structure reform is to determine the compensation of circulating shareholders to non-circulating ones.This article is trying to build a bargaining model to discuss the consideration within a limit period of time and without a limit of time.Studies have shown that the results of consideration game between circulating shareholders and non-irculating ones depend on the ratio of each one's discount factor.Considering that government's supervision and the introduction of time restricdons increase the cost of non-irculating shareholders, the final stock-based compensation solutions can only be implemented within a certain range, which is a function determined by the proposal cost of noncirculating shareholders, the game number and the punishment cost.

Key words: equity division, bargain, consideration, game

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