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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2008, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (5): 84-89.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

消费者驱动的制销供应链联盟安全信号传递

孟炯1,2, 唐小我1, 倪得兵1   

  1. 1. 电子科技大学管理学院, 四川成都610054;
    2. 西南科技大学经济管理学院, 四川绵阳621010
  • 收稿日期:2008-03-03 修回日期:2008-10-06 出版日期:2008-10-31 发布日期:2008-10-31
  • 作者简介:孟炯(1974- ),男(汉族),四川阆中市人,电子科技大学管理学院,博士研究生,西南科技大学经济管理学院,讲师,研究方向:供应链管理.
  • 基金资助:

    教育部科学技术研究重点项目(105149);教育部博士点基金资助项目(20060614023);科技部科技基础性工作专项项目(2007FY140400)

Consumer-Driving Safety Signaling of Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chain Alliance

MENG Jiong1,2, TANG Xiao-wo1, NI De-bing1   

  1. 1. School of Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China;
    2. School of Economic Management, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang 621010, China
  • Received:2008-03-03 Revised:2008-10-06 Online:2008-10-31 Published:2008-10-31

PDF (PC)

1237

被引次数

38

摘要： 从企业社会责任的一个方面——产品安全性能对消费者的影响入手,运用博弈论的基本思想,对供应链信息不对称条件下,制销联盟安全信号传递原理进行了研究。结果表明:g类制销联盟采取积极的安全信号传递策略,发出强度令b类制销联盟难以模仿的信号,市场会出现理想的分离均衡,使产品在安全责任上差异化,从而增强g类产品的竞争力。结论对供应链各成员的决策具有重要的指导意义。

关键词: 制销供应链联盟, 安全责任, 消费者偏好, 信号传递, 博弈论

Abstract: From the perspective of the Corporate Social Responsibilities-the product safety,and its influence on the consumers,this paper applies the basic idea of game theory,investigates the principle of the signaling of manufacturer-retailer alliance under the supply chain's asymmetric safety information. then the results indicate:g manufacturer-retailer alliance adopt the positive safety signaling strategies,and they send out the signals which are not imitated by the b manufacturer-retailer alliance,the market will disassodate in a balanced and satisfactory. This method can make product difference on safety responsibility,and reinforce competitiveness of g product. The conclusion will provide important decision guidances to each member of the supply chain.

Key words: manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance, safety responsibility, consumer’s preferences, signaling, game theory

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