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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2009, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (3): 166-172.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于差异产品的政府最优R&D补贴策略研究

方海燕1,2, 达庆利1   

  1. 1. 东南大学经济管理学院, 江苏南京 210001;
    2. 金陵科技学院商学院, 江苏南京 210001
  • 收稿日期:2008-09-09 修回日期:2009-03-20 出版日期:2009-06-30 发布日期:2009-06-30
  • 作者简介:方海燕(1963- ),女(汉族),江苏灌云人,东南大学管理学院,副教授,博士,研究方向:产业组织理论、博弈论.
  • 基金资助:

    高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20030286008)

Research of Optimal R&D Subsidy Strategic with Product Differentiation

FANG Hai-yan1,2, DA Qing-li 1   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210001, China;
    2. Department of Business, Jinling Institute of Technology, Nanjing 210001, China
  • Received:2008-09-09 Revised:2009-03-20 Online:2009-06-30 Published:2009-06-30

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摘要： 本文建立考虑产品差异的三阶段双寡头博弈模型:第一阶段政府选择R&D(Research and Development)补贴率,第二阶段企业确定自己的R&D水平,第三阶段企业确定产品价格进行伯川德竞争。根据双寡头在第二和第三阶段是否合作,给出了R&D竞争、R&D卡特尔、共同实验、技术共享联盟和研究共同体等五种R&D策略,得到了相应的政府最优R&D补贴率。研究表明,当技术溢出程度较低且产品水平差异不大时,政府给予采用R&D竞争策略企业的补贴率不高于采用R&D卡特尔策略的企业;当技术溢出程度较高且产品水平差异较大时,结果则相反。在政府进行最优补贴后,从促进技术进步、扩大企业规模以及社会福利最大化的角度来看,五种R&D策略中,共同实验最差,技术共享联盟和研究共同体则最优。

关键词: R&D策略, 政府补贴, 伯川德竞争, 产品差异化, 技术溢出

Abstract: This paper constructs a three-stage game model of duopoly firms with product differentiation. The government chooses the R &D subsidy rate at the first stage,firm determines its R &D expenditure at the second stage,and firm sets its price under Bertrand competition at the third stage. According to whether the duopoly cooperates in R &D and price stage,this paper gives the government's optimal R &D subsidy rate under five different cases which are competition R &D,cartel R &D,joint lab,technology sharing cartel and research joint venture respectively. It is showed that the subsidy rate under noncooperation R &D case is smaller than that under cartel R &D case while the technology spillover and product differentiation are lower;the subsidy rate under noncooperation R &D case is larger than that under cartel R &D case while the technology spillover and product differentiation are higher. After the government gives the optimal R &D subsidy rate,the strategic Joint Lab is the worst and the strategies of Technology Sharing Cartel and Research Joint Venture are the best in the five strategies through the perspectives of technology progress,output of the firms and the total welfare.

Key words: strategic R &D, government’s subsidy, Bertrand competition, product differentiation, technology spillover

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