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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2009, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (2): 52-58.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

制销供应链安全责任的消费者驱动研究

孟炯1,2, 唐小我1, 倪得兵1   

  1. 1. 电子科技大学经济与管理学院, 四川成都610054;
    2. 西南科技大学经济管理学院, 四川绵阳621010
  • 收稿日期:2008-08-25 修回日期:2009-03-15 出版日期:2009-04-30 发布日期:2009-04-30
  • 作者简介:孟炯(1974- ).男(汉族).四川阆中市人.电f科技大学经济与管理学院.博士研究生,西南科技大学经济管理学院讲帅.研究方向:供应链管理.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金(70702025);教育部科学技术研究重点项目(105149);教育部博士点基金资助项目(20060614023)

Consumer-Driving Decision of Safety Responsibility of Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chain

MENG Jiong1,2, TANG Xiao-wo1, NI De-bing1   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology Chengdu 610054, China;
    2. School of Economics Management, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang 621010, China
  • Received:2008-08-25 Revised:2009-03-15 Online:2009-04-30 Published:2009-04-30

PDF (PC)

1602

被引次数

32

摘要： 从企业社会责任的一个方面——产品的安全性能对消费者偏好的影响入手,运用博弈论的基本思想,对消费者驱动的制销供应链安全责任决策进行了研究。结果表明:g类制销联盟较好地履行安全责任,能提高消费者对g类产品的支付意愿,从而获得较高的利润,这将对g类制销联盟进一步较好地履行安全责任产生激励驱动;若g类制销联盟未能较好地履行安全责任,消费者会用抵制购买(这种抵制行为会造成g类制销联盟的利润损失)的惩罚方式来驱动其较好地履行安全责任。g类制销联盟的最优决策是在控制成本的基础上较好地履行安全责任。本文的研究成果对供应链各成员的决策均有重要的指导意义。

关键词: 制销供应链联盟, 利润分配, 安全责任, 消费者驱动, 博弈论

Abstract: Starting from one perspective of the corporate social responsibilities-the product safety and its influence on the consumers,applying the basic idea of game theory,the essay studies consumer-driving de cision for safety responsibility of manufacturer-retailer supply chain.The results show that it can heighten consumer's pay desire to g product that gmanufacturer-retailer alliance fulfills safety responsibilities bet ter,thereby achieves higher profit.The situation will incentive gmanufacturer-retailer alliance to fulfill safety responsibilities better further.Consumer will drive gmanufacturer-retailer alliance to fulfill safety responsibilities better with punishing ways if gmanufacturer-retailer alliance fulfills safety responsibilities badly,the punishing ways comefrom consumer's boycott,which will make gmanufacturer-retailer alli ance a loss of profits.The perfect decision of gmanufacturer-retailer alliance is fulfilling safety responsibil ides better on the basis of controlling cost.The study will provide avaluable guidance to the decision of supply chain.

Key words: manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance, profit allotting, safety responsibility, consumer-driving, game theory

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