多因素采购组合拍卖动态机制设计研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2008, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (1): 104-110.

多因素采购组合拍卖动态机制设计研究

黄河¹, 陈剑², 徐鸿雁²

1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院重庆400044;
2. 清华大学经济管理学院北京100084

收稿日期:2007-04-02 修回日期:2007-11-20 出版日期:2008-02-28 发布日期:2008-02-28
作者简介:黄河(1977—),男(汉族),重庆人,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院博士,副教授,研究方向:组合拍卖、机制设计、竞赛理论.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70701040)

Research on Multi-Attribute Procurement Combinatorial Auction Dynamic Mechanism Design

HUANG He¹, CHEN Jian², XU Hong-yan²

1.School of Economics Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Received:2007-04-02 Revised:2007-11-20 Online:2008-02-28 Published:2008-02-28

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在允许"价格-质量"投标的多因素投标环境下,设计了一种多因素采购组合拍卖的动态机制(规则),提出了竞争均衡打分的概念。构建了多因素采购组合拍卖动态机制的优化模型,讨论了拍卖规则和优化模型实现互补松弛条件之间的必然联系。基本结论是:在本拍卖机制中,投标者采用最佳近视反应投标策略,将使拍卖的分配结果趋向最优,最终在拍卖结束时实现系统效用最大化。

关键词: 多因素采购拍卖, 组合拍卖, 动态机制设计

Abstract: We design an iterative procurement combinatorial auction (CA) rules based on price-quality bidding pattern,then construct the conception "competitive equilibrium score"(CES) to formulate optimization problem for the quality-related CA mechanism. By applying CES and a linear program plus its dual, we model the objective function as allocation efficiency and constraints according to the auction rules. The model implements a primal-dual algorithm for the auction,computing a feasible primal and a feasible dual that satisfy complementary slackness conditions when auction terminates,meanwhile allocation efficiency is achieved in the iterative procurement CA.

Key words: multi-attribute procurement auction, combinatorial auction, dynamic mechanism design

中图分类号:

F830

黄河, 陈剑, 徐鸿雁. 多因素采购组合拍卖动态机制设计研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2008, 16(1): 104-110.

HUANG He, CHEN Jian, XU Hong-yan. Research on Multi-Attribute Procurement Combinatorial Auction Dynamic Mechanism Design[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2008, 16(1): 104-110.