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中国管理科学 ›› 2003, Vol. ›› Issue (1): 60-62.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

R&D合作与政府最优政策博弈分析

鲁文龙, 陈宏民   

  1. 上海交通大学管理学院 上海 200030
  • 收稿日期:2001-04-09 出版日期:2003-02-28 发布日期:2012-03-06
  • 基金资助:
    教育部博士点基金资助项目(20010248038)

The Analysis of R&D Cooperation and The Government Optimal Policy with Game Theory

LU Wen-long, CHEN Hong-min   

  1. Management School, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200032, China
  • Received:2001-04-09 Online:2003-02-28 Published:2012-03-06

摘要: 本文在开放的经济环境下,对国内和国外两个企业的R&D行为及政府的补贴政策行为进行了分析。结果表明:(1)当企业间的R&D交流很少时,两个企业的R&D投资存在此消彼长的关系;而当企业间存在密切的R&D交流时,两个企业的R&D投资可以互相促进;(2)企业间的技术交流与合作是必要的,可以有利于整个社会福利的提高;(3)政府更倾向于补贴本国企业。

关键词: Cournot竞争, R&D, 政府补贴, 技术合作

Abstract: Under the opening circumstances,this paper analyzed a domestic firm and a foreign one’s R&D behavior and government’s subsidy policy.The results are as follows:first,when there exists little R&D intercommunication,the R&D investment of one firm will increase,and another will decrease;however,when there exists close R&D intercommunication,the two firms’ R&D investments will be promoted each other.Second,intercommunication between firms is necessary,and that will improve social welfare.Third,governments are inclined to subsidize domestic firms.

Key words: Cournot competition, R&D, government’s subsidy, technology cooperation

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