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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2003, Vol. ›› Issue (6): 29-34.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

一类供应链的线性转移支付激励机制研究

唐宏祥1, 何建敏1, 刘春林2   

  1. 1. 东南大学经济管理学院 南京 210018;
    2. 南京大学商学院 南京 210093
  • 收稿日期:2003-01-29 修回日期:2003-08-11 出版日期:2003-12-28 发布日期:2012-03-06
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70101003)

Research on Linear Transfer Payment Incentive Mechanism of One Kind of Supply Chain

TANG Hong-xiang1, HE Jian-min1, LIU Chun-lin2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210018, China;
    2. Business School of Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China
  • Received:2003-01-29 Revised:2003-08-11 Online:2003-12-28 Published:2012-03-06

PDF (PC)

1987

被引次数

144

摘要： 针对不同的供应链设计不同的契约是供应链协作的一个重要手段。在由一个零售商和一个供应商组成的供应链中,零售商的促销努力水平对供应链的效率有重大的影响,本文提出了一种线性转移支付激励机制,且证明了在该机制的作用下,零售商将付出对整个供应链最优的促销努力水平,这时供应链的总收益将得到提高,而对新增收益的划分则取决于供应商和零售商之间的讨价还价能力。

关键词: 供应链管理, 激励机制, 供应链契约

Abstract: Proper contract is used as an important way to coordinate supply chain.In a supply chain composed of one retailer and one supplier,the sales promotion effort level of a retailer has a big effect on supply chain efficiency.In this paper a linear transfer payment incentive mechanism is designed,and it is proved that with the mechanism the retailer will exercise the supply chain optimized sales promotion effort level,and the profit of the supply chain will get better,and the allocation of the added profit is decided by the bargain power of the retailer and supplier.

Key words: supply chain management, incentive mechanism, supply chain contract

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