厂商产品线设计的委托代理分析

中国管理科学 ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (1): 117-121.

厂商产品线设计的委托代理分析

李善良, 左敏, 朱道立

复旦大学管理学院, 上海, 200433

收稿日期:2004-03-03 修回日期:2005-01-04 出版日期:2005-02-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
基金资助:
国家重大自然科学基金资助项目(70432001)

The Analysis on the Principal-Agent Model of a Product Line Design

LI Shan-liang, ZUO Min, ZHU Dao-li

Management School, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China

Received:2004-03-03 Revised:2005-01-04 Online:2005-02-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文通过委托代理理论研究了厂商的产品线设计问题。在厂商进行产品线设计时,厂商需要根据不同的消费者偏好设计不同的产品,但是厂商不能明确的分别消费者的偏好,因此厂商与消费者存在着信息不对称现象,为了攫取利益的最大化,厂商通过提供甄别契约,让消费者进行自选择,有效的对消费者进行了区分(即对市场进行了有效分割)。本文以简单的案例分析入手,然后将其推广。对在信息不对称情况下厂商如何提供甄别契约进行产品线设计进行了较为详尽的分析,并对其中的经济学意义进行了解释。

关键词: 供应链契约, 产品线设计, 不对称信息, 信息甄别, 委托代理

Abstract: In the competition strategy,an important question is how a firm can optimally design and price a product.In this paper,we make a detailed analysis about how a firm design the screening contract to find the best solution in the circumstance of information asymmetry and derive the general conclusion.

Key words: Supply chain contracts, product line design, information asymmetry, screening, principal-agent

中图分类号:

F939
F27

李善良, 左敏, 朱道立. 厂商产品线设计的委托代理分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2005, (1): 117-121.

LI Shan-liang, ZUO Min, ZHU Dao-li. The Analysis on the Principal-Agent Model of a Product Line Design[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2005, (1): 117-121.

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