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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (2): 137-141.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

纵向沟通中隐性信息获取的激励兼容机制研究

叶志桂, 颜光华   

  1. 上海财经大学国际工商管理学院, 上海, 200083
  • 收稿日期:2003-10-29 修回日期:2005-03-18 出版日期:2005-04-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372068)

A Research on Incentive Mechanism of Learning Hidden Information in Vertical Communication

YE Zhi-gui, YAN Guang-hua   

  1. School of International Business Management, Shanghai University of Finance and Economic, Shanghai 200083, China
  • Received:2003-10-29 Revised:2005-03-18 Online:2005-04-28 Published:2012-03-07

PDF (PC)

2005

被引次数

11

摘要： 下属隐性信息的获取是确保上级决策者有效决策的一个重要基础,现有的研究未能解决隐性信息获取的效率问题与预算平衡的两难问题。本文通过确认决策者的作用,在分析模型中引入决策者成本,并借鉴政府征收"所得税"的思路,不仅解决了隐性信息获取的真实性,而且解决了原有方案未能同时兼顾的预算平衡、利润最大化以及向下属转移损失等问题。

关键词: 纵向沟通, 隐性信息, 激励兼容机制

Abstract: To obtain the hidden information from subordinate is a basic factor for higher level authorities to make decision,researches have been done cannot solute the dilemma between efficiency and budget balance.In this article,having recognized the role of decision maker,and introducing the cost of decision maker,the authors put forward a new mechanism,which can not only solve the question of obtaining the hidden information,but also settle the questions of budget balance,profit maximum and shifting the lose to subordinate.

Key words: hidden information, vertical communication, incentive mechanism

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