信息交流在群体性突发事件处理中作用的博弈分析

中国管理科学 ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 95-102.

信息交流在群体性突发事件处理中作用的博弈分析

刘德海

东北财经大学数量经济系, 大连, 116025

收稿日期:2004-03-18 修回日期:2005-06-07 出版日期:2005-06-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金优秀创新群体资助项目(70121001).

The Role of Communication in the Mass Unexpected Incident Management

LIU De-hai

Department of Econometric, Northeast University of Finance & Economics, Dalian 116025, China

Received:2004-03-18 Revised:2005-06-07 Online:2005-06-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文运用演化博弈理论,对信息交流在不同发展阶段的群体性突发事件处理中发挥的截然不同的作用进行了分析。在一般化模仿者动态模型基础上得出了群体性突发事件处制度危机阶段和制度转型阶段的扩散方程,其退化为包含学习障碍的传染病扩散方程。通过将不同策略的学习障碍加以内生化,使其成为信息公开程度的函数,分析了政府部门采取的信息公开措施在群体性突发事件不同发展阶段中的作用。研究结果表明,在群体性突发事件处于制度危机阶段时政府部门应控制信息交流程度;处于制度转型阶段时应该及时进行信息披露,引导不同的社会阶层对新体制形成稳定的认知均衡。

关键词: 信息交流, 演化博弈, 群体性突发事件, 一般化模仿者动态模型, 社会弱势群体

Abstract: This paper analyses the different effects that the communication has on the measure of mass unexpected incident in the different developing phases using evolutionary game theory.It educes the evolutionary functions that mass unexpected incident is in the system crisis phase and transforming phase using the generalized replicator dynamics model,that degenerate to the infection diffusion function including learning obstacle.It analyses the effect that governmnt takes opening communication measure in the different phases,through making strategy-specific barriers to learning endogenetic disposed that is the funetion of the opening communication degree.It draws the conclusion that government needs to control the opening communication degree in the system crisis phase,and duly open communication in order to lead different social estates to engender the new cognizing equilibrium in the system transformaing phase.

Key words: communication, evolutionary game, mass unexpected incident, generalized replicator dynamics, social weak population

中图分类号:

C931

刘德海. 信息交流在群体性突发事件处理中作用的博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2005, (3): 95-102.

LIU De-hai. The Role of Communication in the Mass Unexpected Incident Management[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2005, (3): 95-102.

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