基于声誉理论的我国经理人动态激励模型研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (4): 78-86.

基于声誉理论的我国经理人动态激励模型研究

刘惠萍^1,2, 张世英¹

1. 天津大学管理学院, 天津, 300072;
2. 山东经济学院, 山东, 济南, 250014

收稿日期:2004-11-12 修回日期:2005-07-15 出版日期:2005-08-28 发布日期:2012-03-07

A Study on the Dynamic Incentive Model of Chinese Managers Based on Reputation Theory

LIU Hui-ping^1,2, ZHANG Shi-ying¹

1. School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China;
2. Shandong Economic University, Jinan 250014, China

Received:2004-11-12 Revised:2005-07-15 Online:2005-08-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文基于声誉理论,建立了一个关于经理人声誉机制与显性机制相结合的最优动态契约模型,以形成长期激励与短期激励相结合的激励模式,根据分析得出了实现声誉有效激励的条件和提高声誉激励效应的途径,并与没有引入声誉机制的契约模型进行了比较,通过实例验证了声誉机制与显性机制相结合的最优动态契约模型的合理性,对于如何有效地发挥声誉机制对我国经理人的激励作用提出了一些建议。

关键词: 声誉机制, 显性激励机制, 最优动态契约模型, 经理人

Abstract: Based on reputation theory,a model of optimal dynamic incentive contract,which combines reputation mechanism with explicit incentive mechanism for managers,is established.Conditions of achieving effective reputation incentive and ways to enhancing incentive effect are pointed out.Furthermore,this model is compared with a model of explicit incentive contract without reputation mechanism and its rationality is validated by an example.Last,suggestions about how to bring reputation mechanism into play for motivating managers of China are made.

Key words: reputation mechanism, explicit incentive mechanism, the model of optimal dynamic contract, managers

中图分类号:

F272

刘惠萍, 张世英. 基于声誉理论的我国经理人动态激励模型研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2005, (4): 78-86.

LIU Hui-ping, ZHANG Shi-ying. A Study on the Dynamic Incentive Model of Chinese Managers Based on Reputation Theory[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2005, (4): 78-86.

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