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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (4): 135-141.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

激励企业技术创新的两种管制方式

殷红1, 王先甲2   

  1. 1. 华东师范大学商学院, 上海, 200062;
    2. 武汉大学系统工程研究所, 武汉, 430072
  • 收稿日期:2004-11-12 修回日期:2005-07-16 出版日期:2005-08-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(60274048)

Two Regulatory Means for Inducing Technical Innovation of Enterprises

YIN Hong1, WANG Xian-jia2   

  1. 1. School of Business, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China;
    2. Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
  • Received:2004-11-12 Revised:2005-07-16 Online:2005-08-28 Published:2012-03-07

PDF (PC)

2000

被引次数

24

摘要： 本文旨在探讨激励垄断企业技术创新的两种管制方式——价格上限管制和最优管制机制。首先分别建立了它们的管制模型,得出了激励企业技术创新的具体的管制机制;进一步地,比较了在这两种管制方式下企业创新的内在激励,以及创新费用的增加对消费者剩余的影响;并分析了当激励企业创新问题引入时,两种管制方式相对优势的改变。

关键词: 价格上限管制, 最优管制机制, 技术创新, 激励

Abstract: This paper studies two regulatory means for encouraging technical innovation of enterprises-price cap regulation and optimal regulatory mechanism.Firstly,we establish the two regulatory models and get the corresponding regulatory mechanisms to induce innovation of enterprises.Then the performances of the two regulatory means are compared,which include the internal incentive of the enterprise for innovation and the welfare loss associated with the increase of innovation expenses.Further,we analyze the change of relative advantages between the two regulatory means when the incentive for innovation of enterprises is introduced.

Key words: price cap regulation, optimal regulation mechanism, technical innovation, incentive

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