销售商费用信息不完全下的回收合约

中国管理科学 ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (6): 39-45.

销售商费用信息不完全下的回收合约

张菊亮¹, 陈剑²

1. 中国科学院数据技术与知识经济研究中心, 中国科学院研究生院, 北京, 100080;
2. 清华大学经济管理学院, 北京, 100084

收稿日期:2005-01-05 修回日期:2005-11-10 出版日期:2005-12-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(703020037023101070321001)

The Buy Back Contract under Incomplete Retailer’s Cost Information

ZHANG Ju-liang¹, CHEN Jian²

1. Research Center on Data Technolgoy & Knowledge Management, Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Received:2005-01-05 Revised:2005-11-10 Online:2005-12-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 回收合约是一种非常流行的合约。但是,到目前为止,大多数的文献都假定合约的提出者知道供应商和销售商的费用结构。本文考虑不完全信息下的回收合约。供应商提出合约,但不知道零售商的费用结构。在这种情况下,我们研究回收合约的设计及对供应商、销售商和供应链的影响。我们的结论显示,如果合约的设计者不知道销售商的费用结构,他就不可能设计出使供应链达到合作的合约。这就说明共享销售商的费用信息是有价值的。

关键词: 供应链, 合约, 回收型合约, 不完全信息

Abstract: The buy back contract is a popular contract.Most of the literatures on it assumed that the cost structures of both the supplier and the retailer are common knowledge so far.In this paper,we study the buy back contract under incomplete information.In our model,supplier proposes contract.He does not know the retailer’s cost structure.We investigate the impact of buy back contract on the supplier,the retailer and the supply chain as a whole.

Key words: supply chain, contract, buy back, incomplete information

中图分类号:

F830

张菊亮, 陈剑. 销售商费用信息不完全下的回收合约[J]. 中国管理科学, 2005, (6): 39-45.

ZHANG Ju-liang, CHEN Jian. The Buy Back Contract under Incomplete Retailer’s Cost Information[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2005, (6): 39-45.

参考文献

[1] Cachon,G.P.,Supply chain coordination with contracts [C].In Handbook in Operation Research and Management Science:Supply Chain Management,edited by S.Graves and Ton de Kok,North-Holland,2003.
[2] Cachon,G.P.,Lariviere,M.Supply chain coordination with revenue sharing:strengths and limitations [R].University of Pennsyvania working paper,2000.
[3] Cachon,G.P.and Lariviere,M.,Contracting to assure supply:how to share demand forcasts in a supply chain[J].Management Science,2001,45:936-953.
[4] Chen,F.,Information sharing and supply chain coordination [R].Working paper,DRO-2002-02,Columbia Business School,2002.
[5] Corbett,C.J.and Tang,C.S.,Designing supply chain contracts:Contract type and information asymmetric [C].In Quantitative Models for Supply Chain Management,edited by Tayur,S.,Ganeshan,R.and Magazine,M.,Kluwer Academic Publishers,2000.
[6] Corbett,C.J.and X.de Groote,A supplier' s optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information [J].Management Science,2000,46:444-450.
[7] Donohue,K.,Efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating and two production modes [J].Management Science,2000,46:1397-1411.
[8] Emmons,H.,Gilbert,S.,Returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods [J].Management Science,1998,44:276-283.
[9] Ha,A.Y.,Supply contract for a short-life-cycle product with demand uncertainty and asymmetric cost information [R].Working paper,Yale School of Management,1997.
[10] Lariviere,M.,Inducing forecast revelation through restricted return [R].Working paper,Northwest University,2002.
[11] Moorthy,K.S.,Managing channel profits:comment [J].Marketing Science,1987,6:375-379.
[12] Pasternack,B.A.,Optimal pricing and returns policies for perishable commodities [J].Marketing Science,1985,4:166-176.
[13] 邵晓峰,季建华,黄培清.供应链库存合约研究[J].中国管理科学,2004,12(2):45-48.
[14] Taylor,T.Coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effect [R].Stanford University working paper,2000.
[15] 张菊亮,陈剑.销售商的努力影响需求变化的供应链的合约[J].中国管理科学,2004,12(4):50-56.