非同类企业竞争与合作策略收益模型及风险分析

中国管理科学 ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (6): 52-56.

非同类企业竞争与合作策略收益模型及风险分析

李森, 杨锡怀

东北大学工商管理学院, 辽宁, 沈阳, 110004

收稿日期:2005-02-24 修回日期:2005-11-15 出版日期:2005-12-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(79870020)

Income Model and Risk Analysis of of Non-Similar Enterprise’s Competition and Co-operation Strategy

LI Sen, YANG Xi-huai

School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China

Received:2005-02-24 Revised:2005-11-15 Online:2005-12-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在比较同类企业竞争策略模型与合作策略模型的基础上,讨论了价格的信息作用,分析了合作策略收益更大和风险并不随之增加的原因。然后以现代决策理念为出发点,探讨了企业最大利润与企业条件的关系,提出了与企业单位变动成本和生产能力条件相适应的合理最大利润的概念,对“理性企业的假设”赋予了“追求与企业条件相适应的合理最大利润”的新含义。据此设计了非同类企业产量分配函数,建立了适用性更广的非同类企业合作策略最佳收益模型,并给出了随市场价格变化的企业最佳应对策略。最后用1个算例来直观体现合作策略的优势。

关键词: 竞争策略, 合作策略, 收益, 风险

Abstract: With the comparison between models of similar enterprises set up respectively under competition strategy and co-operation strategy,the informational function of price has been discussed,and the reasons why co-operation strategy contributes to big income and low probability of risk have been explored.Starting with the utilization of modern decision-making theory,the relationship between the maximum profit and conditions of the enterprise has been analyzed,and the concept of reasonable maximum profit in conformity with variable cost per unit and output capacity conditions has been put forward.Moreover,"to pursue reasonable maximum profit in conformity with enterprise conditions"as a new notion,has been attached to "assumption of rational enterprise".Accordingly,an output distribution function of dissimilar enterprises has been designed,a more adaptable maximum profit model of dissimilar enterprises under co-operation strategy has been set up,and the optimum enterprise response to the fluctuation of market prices has been suggested.Finally,a calculated case is put forward to illustrate the advantages of co-operation strategy directly.

Key words: competition strategy, cooperation strategy, income, risk

中图分类号:

F271

李森, 杨锡怀. 非同类企业竞争与合作策略收益模型及风险分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2005, (6): 52-56.

LI Sen, YANG Xi-huai. Income Model and Risk Analysis of of Non-Similar Enterprise’s Competition and Co-operation Strategy[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2005, (6): 52-56.

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