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中国管理科学 ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (6): 108-112.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

人力资本显性激励与隐性激励的组合合同分析

陈爽英1,2, 唐小我2, 马永开2   

  1. 1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆, 400044;
    2. 电子科技大学管理学院, 成都, 610054
  • 收稿日期:2004-06-08 修回日期:2005-03-16 出版日期:2005-12-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
  • 基金资助:
    高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题(20030614011);国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(79725002)

Studies on Combination Contract of Explicit and Implicit Incentives to Human Capital

CHEN Shuang-ying1,2, TANG Xiao-wo2, MA Yong-kai2   

  1. 1. Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;
    2. University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China
  • Received:2004-06-08 Revised:2005-03-16 Online:2005-12-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要: 本文主要是对企业家人力资本基于主观业绩的隐性激励合同与客观业绩的显性激励合同的组合激励进行的研究。文中首先分别提出显性激励合同模型与隐性激励合同模型,随之在静态分析的基础上,深入分析组合激励合同模型中相关参数的变化含义,并说明组合激励合同的意义:在一定约束下,可同时增加企业家和所有者的期望收入。

关键词: 隐性激励合同, 显性激励合同, 人力资本, 企业家

Abstract: The paper analyses combinative incentive contract,including implicit incentive contract based on subjective performance and explicit contract based on objective performance to entrepreneur human capital.The implicit incentive contract and explicit incentive contract models are given firstly.On the base of static analysis,the change meaning of relative parameters in the model is deeply discussed and the significance of combination incentive contract is that the expected gains of the entrepreneur and the owner are increased under the restraints.

Key words: implicit incentive contract, explicit incentive contract, human capital, entrepreneur

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