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中国管理科学 ›› 2006, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 103-107.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

认同度对相关性评价的影响分析

吕周洋, 吴广谋, 何建敏   

  1. 东南大学经济管理学院, 南京, 210096
  • 收稿日期:2005-08-09 修回日期:2006-03-24 出版日期:2006-06-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371035)

Analysis of Effects of Identification on Relevant Evaluation

Lü Zhou-yang, WU Guang-mou, HE Jianmin   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
  • Received:2005-08-09 Revised:2006-03-24 Online:2006-06-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要: 本文针对相关性评价的复合性,建立了“一主多从”的博弈模型,以分析参与互评的多个利益相关者之间的关系,特别是欺诈性合谋的可能性.借助数学模型,定量地讨论了企业文化中,认同度和企业制度建设之间的互动关系.结果表明,认同度的提高有助于评价的顺利进行,但制度建设是不可替代的,否则将无法避免合谋的出现.相关性评价的效果既依赖于员工的认同度,也依赖于制度建设.

关键词: 相关性评价, 纳什均衡, 认同度, 主从对策

Abstract: In this paper,a game-model of "leader with multiple followers" was founded to analyze the relevant evaluation.It discussed the relationship,especially the potential conspiracy,between multiple constituency.Arguments from mathematical models quantitatively validated the interdependence between culture and institution within an enterprise.It also authenticated the necessity of institution construction.

Key words: relevant evaluation, Nash equilibrium,identification, leaderfollower strategy

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