公共管理领域监察合谋防范机制

中国管理科学 ›› 2006, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 116-121.

公共管理领域监察合谋防范机制

董志强^1,2, 蒲勇健²

1. 华南师范大学经管学院, 广州, 510006;
2. 重庆大学经管学院, 重庆, 400044

收稿日期:2005-08-24 修回日期:2006-04-04 出版日期:2006-06-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
基金资助:
教育部人文社科研究规划基金项目(02JA790062)

Collusion-Proof Mechanism in Supervising in Public Administration

DONG Zhi-qiang^1,2, PU Yong-jian²

1. School of Economics and Management, South China Normal University, Guangzhou 510006, China;
2. College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 00044, China

Received:2005-08-24 Revised:2006-04-04 Online:2006-06-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 公共管理领域监察合谋行为极为常见,对其的分析不应只简单地考虑双边共谋,而应将监察者合谋可能性以及合谋防范纳入多层次代理完全合约框架中予以考虑.通过一个“政府/监察者/企业”三层次代理模型表明,事前的低成本、高效率惩罚机制对合谋防范合约的效率非常重要.纯粹依赖于支付防合谋激励报酬的合约安排难有效率,而纯粹依赖惩罚防范合谋的合约安排也只在某些条件下有效率.模型亦可考察政府在生产的社会利益和社会代价之间的权衡行为.

关键词: 公共管理, 监察, 合谋, 多层级代理

Abstract: Collusion is a hackneyed phenomenon in supervising in public administration.Two-side collusion model is too simple to analyze it,and we should consider the collusion probability and collusion-proof mechanism in a multiple-tier-agency complete contract framework.This paper presents a "government/supervisor/firm"three-tier hierarchy model and shows that,an ex ante lowcost-and-high-efficiency punishment device is important for collusion-proof contract.Contract based on collusion-proof incentive compensations absolutely will have little efficiency,and contract based on punishment device absolutely will have efficiency only in some specific conditions.Our model can also be used in analyzing the government choice behavior in trade-off of social benefits and social costs of production.

Key words: public administration, supervise, collusion, multiple-tier agency

中图分类号:

C931

董志强, 蒲勇健. 公共管理领域监察合谋防范机制[J]. 中国管理科学, 2006, (3): 116-121.

DONG Zhi-qiang, PU Yong-jian. Collusion-Proof Mechanism in Supervising in Public Administration[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2006, (3): 116-121.

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