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中国管理科学 ›› 2006, Vol. ›› Issue (4): 46-49.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

伴随销售商促销努力的供应链契约设计

姬小利   

  1. 郑州大学管理工程系, 河南省, 郑州市, 450001
  • 收稿日期:2005-12-14 修回日期:2006-07-11 出版日期:2006-08-28 发布日期:2012-03-07

Supply Chain Contract Designing with Retailer Promotional Effort

JI Xiao-li   

  1. Department of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China
  • Received:2005-12-14 Revised:2006-07-11 Online:2006-08-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要: 在大多数供应链契约文献中,市场需求被假设为了一个独立的外生随机变量.但实际情况中,市场需求往往受到销售商各种促销活动的影响.文中首先分析了在市场需求受促销活动影响情况下的集中控制模式及不合作模式的销售商最优促销努力水平和最优订购数量的决策问题;然后设计了基于回购契约的促销成本分担契约协调机制;最后通过一个算例比较了在不采取任何促销活动、不合作情况下销售商单方进行促销活动以及协调机制下销售商进行促销活动三种策略下的供应链绩效水平.

关键词: 供应链协调, 供应链契约, 回购契约, 促销努力

Abstract: In most supply chain contract literatures,the customers' demand is often hypothesized as an independent and exogenous stochastic variable.But in factual conditions,it is often influenced by retailer's promotional effort.In this article,optimal promotional effort and order quantity of the integrated and non-cooperative modes are firstly analyzed under demand with promotional effort.Then a buy-back contract with effort sharing is founded to coordinate incentive discrepancy between supply chain members.Finally,an instance displays the different supply chain performance under the different strategies with no promotional effort and coordination,with promotional effort but no coordination,and with promotional effort and coordination.

Key words: supply chain coordination, supply chain contract, buy-back contract, promotional effort

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