Bertrand竞争下融资策略与产品差异化策略的博弈分析

中国管理科学 ›› 2006, Vol. ›› Issue (4): 88-94.

Bertrand竞争下融资策略与产品差异化策略的博弈分析

杨广青^1,2, 蒋录全¹, 王浣尘¹, 陈明义¹

1. 上海交通大学管理学院, 上海, 200052;
2. 福州大学管理学院, 福州, 350002

收稿日期:2005-01-31 修回日期:2006-03-10 出版日期:2006-08-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(79870052);上海市科技发展基金软科学研究博士生论文资助项目

The Game Analysis on Financing Strategy and Product Differentiation Strategy in the Frame of Bertrand Competition

YANG Guang-qing^1,2, JIANG Lu-quan¹, WANG Huan-chen¹, CHEN Ming-yi¹

1. School of Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200052, China;
2. School of Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350002, China

Received:2005-01-31 Revised:2006-03-10 Online:2006-08-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 融资策略与产品差异化策略是企业两大重要的决策.本文通过构造一个纵向产品差异化的三阶段动态博弈模型,研究了不确定环境下,企业债务融资对产品差异化策略和定价策略的影响,并与不存在债务策略下的均衡结果进行了比较.研究表明,负债情形下,企业的均衡质量和均衡价格均高于无负债下的质量和价格,产品纵向差异度低于无负债下的差异度,且负债水平越高,企业的均衡质量、均衡价格和均衡利润越高,企业间的产品纵向差异度也越高.

关键词: 债务融资, 纵向产品差异化, 伯川德竞争, 不确定性

Abstract: The financing strategy and product differentiation strategy both are important basic decisions.In a three-stage dynamic game model based on vertical product differentiation,the article studies that enterprise's debt financing strategy imposes effect on product differentiation strategy and pricing decision under uncertainty,at the same time,we compare competition equilibrium outcomes with that under non-debt financing.The research shows that under debt financing,equilibrium quality and equilibrium price are higher,the degree of vertical product differentiation is lower,also the higher debt level is,the higher the enterprise's equilibrium quality,equilibrium price,equilibrium profit and the degree of vertical product differentiation are.

Key words: debt financing, vertical product differentiation, Bertrand competition, uncertainty

中图分类号:

F223

杨广青, 蒋录全, 王浣尘, 陈明义. Bertrand竞争下融资策略与产品差异化策略的博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2006, (4): 88-94.

YANG Guang-qing, JIANG Lu-quan, WANG Huan-chen, CHEN Ming-yi. The Game Analysis on Financing Strategy and Product Differentiation Strategy in the Frame of Bertrand Competition[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2006, (4): 88-94.

参考文献

[1] Schumpeter,Joseph A.,1943:Capitalism,Socialism and Democracy[M].London:Allen&Unwin; New York:Harper& Row,Colophon Edition,1975.
[2] Brander,J.and B.Spencer.Strategic commitment with R&D:the symmetric case[J].Bell Journal of Economics 1983,14:225-235.
[3] Spencer,B.,Brander,J.International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy[J].Review of Economic Studies,1983,28:707-722.
[4] Fershtman,C.,Grandal,N.Disadvantageous semicollusion[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,1994,12:141-154.
[5] Brod,A.,Shivakumar,R.Advantageous semi-collusion[J].Journal of Industrial Economics,1992,47:221-230.
[6] De Bondt R.,Veugelers,R.Strategic investment with spillovers[J].European Journal of Political Economy,1991,7:345-366.
[7] De Bondt R.,Slaets P.,Cassiman B.The degree of spillovers and the number of rivals for maximum effective R&D[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,1992,10:35-54.
[8] d' Aspremont,C.,Jacquemin,A.Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers[J].American Economic Review,1988,78:1133-1137.
[9] Motta,M.Cooperative R&D and vertical product differentiation[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,1992,10:643-661.
[10] Rosenkranz,S.Innovation and cooperation under vertical product differentiation[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,1995,13:1-22.
[11] 杨广青.寡头市场中企业竞争策略与债务融资策略的博弈分析[D].上海交通大学博士学位论文,2005.
[12] Brander,J.and T.Lewis.Oligopoly and Financial Structure:The Limited Liability Effect[J].American Economic Review,1986,76:956-970.
[13] Maksimovic,V.Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolies[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1988,19:389-407.
[14] Wanzenried,G.Capital structure decisions and output market competition under demand uncertainty[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2003,21:171-200.
[15] Showalter,D.Oligopoly and financial structure:comment[J].American Economic Review,1995,85:647-653.
[16] Dasgupta,S.,and Titman,S.Pricing Strategy and Financial Policy[J].Review of Financial Studies,1998,11:705-737.
[17] Bulow,J.,J.Geanakoplos,and P.Klemperer.Multimarket oligopoly:strategic substitutes and complements[J].Journal of Political Economy,1985,93:488-511.
[18] Yang guangqing,Jiang luquan,Wang Huanchen.The Game Analysis on Financing Strategy and Product Innovation in Oligopoly Competition[J].Proceedings of 2005 International Conference on Management Science & Engineering,445-449.
[19] 格林布莱特,蒂特曼著.贺书婕等译,金融市场与公司战略(上下)[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2003.
[20] 泰勒尔著,张维迎等译.产业组织理论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997.
[21] 马丁著,史东辉等译.高级产业经济学[M].上海:上海财经出版社,2003.
[1] 式中(^a)表示企业1在产品市场上实现盈亏平衡时的随机项值.由于债务的有限责任效应,当企业在产品市场上创造的收入不足以偿还其到期债务时,债权人拥有对这笔收入的求偿权,股东收益则为零,所以,∫(^a)(p1q1(p1,p2)-D)f(ai)dai=0.