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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2006, Vol. ›› Issue (6): 135-139.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

创新能力不对称企业研发投资策略时机研究

吴建祖1, 宣慧玉2   

  1. 1. 兰州大学管理学院, 甘肃, 兰州, 730000;
    2. 西安交通大学管理学院, 陕西, 西安, 710049
  • 收稿日期:2005-10-26 修回日期:2006-10-20 出版日期:2006-12-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371021)

A Study of Strategic R&D Investment Timing of Firms with Asymmetric Innovation Capability

WU Jian-zu1, XUAN Hui-yu2   

  1. 1. School of Management, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000, China;
    2. School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, China
  • Received:2005-10-26 Revised:2006-10-20 Online:2006-12-28 Published:2012-03-07

PDF (PC)

1450

被引次数

19

摘要： 本文运用不对称双寡头期权博弈模型,研究了创新能力差异和先动优势对企业研发投资策略时机的影响,分析了抢先均衡、序贯均衡和同时投资均衡出现的条件.研究表明,当抢先投资的先动优势足够大时,创新能力强的企业抢先创新能力弱的企业投资;当创新能力差异足够大时,两个企业序贯地投资;当创新能力差异较小且不存在明显的先动优势时,两个企业同时投资.在其它条件不变的情况下,创新能力越强,同时投资均衡和序贯均衡出现的可能性越小,抢先均衡出现的可能性越大.

关键词: 研发投资, 策略时机, 期权博弈, 创新能力不对称

Abstract: In an asymmetric duopoly option game-theoretic framework,this paper investigates the impacts of innovation capability asymmetry and the first-move advantage on firms′ strategic R&D investment timing and derives the conditions for the preemptive,sequential and simultaneous equilibrium.We show that when the first-move advantage is significant,the high-capability firm preempts the lower-capability firm.In the situation where the asymmetry between firms becomes sufficiently large,the firms invest sequentially.When the asymmetry among firms is relatively small and so is the first-move advantage,the firms invest simultaneously.We also show that,with the innovation capability increasing,the possibility of simultaneous equilibrium and sequential equilibrium decreases,but that of preemptive equilibrium increases.

Key words: R&D investment, strategic timing, option game, innovation capability asymmetry

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