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主办：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2012, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (2): 93-101.

• 论文 •    

基于两阶段博弈模型的钢铁行业碳强度减排机制研究

李长胜1,2,3, 范英2, 朱磊2   

  1. 1. 中国科学技术大学管理学院, 合肥, 230026;
    2. 中国科学院科技政策与管理科学研究所能源与环境政策研究中心, 北京 100190;
    3. 青岛科技大学, 青岛, 266061
  • 收稿日期:2011-06-28 修回日期:2012-02-17 出版日期:2012-04-29 发布日期:2012-04-25
  • 基金资助:
    中国科学院战略先导专项(XDA05150700);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70825001,71133005)

The Study of Carbon Dioxide Emission Intensity Abatement Mechanism of Iron and Steel Industry Based on Two-Stage Game Model

LI Chang-sheng1,2,3, FAN Ying2, ZHU Lei2   

  1. 1. School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China;
    2. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy research, Institute of Policy and Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;
    3. Qingdao University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266061, China
  • Received:2011-06-28 Revised:2012-02-17 Online:2012-04-29 Published:2012-04-25

PDF (PC)

2872

被引次数

65

摘要： 减少温室气体排放,高耗能行业将承担主要的减排任务,不同的减排机制对减排任务在不同技术水平的企业间分配和减排成本影响不同,而且对企业竞争力和社会福利有影响。本文构造了一个两阶段动态博弈模型,以两个代表性钢铁企业(东部和西部)为研究对象,来考察在完成一定减排目标前提下,政府设置统一碳税和差异化碳税对减排成本、社会经济福利、企业竞争力等的影响。实证结果表明:统一碳税下,钢铁行业产量降幅较小,行业减排任务分解的更加平均,西部钢铁企业竞争力损失较小;差异税下,实现既定减排目标的减排成本较小;社会经济福利损失较小,且随着减排目标的不断升高,两种碳税下社会经济福利损失之差有拉大的趋势;东部钢铁企业竞争力提高幅度较大,但对西部钢铁企业的负面影响十分明显。因此,在碳税机制设计时应充分考虑不同税率模式对减排任务分解、钢铁行业产量、社会经济福利以及企业竞争力的具体影响,需要在社会成本较低和个体企业的竞争力受影响较小之间进行权衡。

关键词: 二氧化碳减排, 两阶段博弈, 减排机制, 钢铁行业

Abstract: Reducing greenhouse gas emissions, energy-intensive industries will bear the main task. However, how to distribute the emission intensity reduction task among firms with different technologies will has a impact on abatement costs, the competitiveness of firms and social economic welfare. Tax on emissions discharged in production process is widely recognized as one of the effective policies. This paper constructs a two-stage dynamic game model based on two representative iron and steel firms (eastern and western) to examine uniform or discriminated emission tax levied by central government effects on abatement costs, social economic welfare and the competitiveness of firms. The empirical results show that: under a unified emissions tax, the steel industry production declines smaller, the emission intensity reduction task is distributed more average among firms and the western steel firm competitiveness losses smaller; Under discriminated emission tax regime, a smaller emission abatement cost is achieved, social economic welfare loss is smaller, eastern steel company competitiveness is improved with a bigger margin, but the negative impact on western iron and steel enterprises is obvious. Therefore, it should take full account of the emission intensity reduction task distribution, iron and steel industry production, social economic welfare, the specific impact the competitiveness of firms on designing the emissions tax and trade-offs between lower abatement cost and the less affected competitiveness of individual firms.

Key words: carbon dioxide emissions reduction, two-stage game, emission abatement mechanism, steel and iron industry

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