新投资机会对大股东攫取控制权私利的影响研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2012, Vol. ›› Issue (2): 167-175.

新投资机会对大股东攫取控制权私利的影响研究

刘星¹, 吴江林¹, 豆中强²

1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400030;
2. 国家开发银行重庆分行, 重庆 400030

收稿日期:2010-10-05 修回日期:2011-12-11 出版日期:2012-04-29 发布日期:2012-04-25
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772100);教育部博士点基金资助项目(教技发中心函[2006]226号);广东省教育厅人文社科研究项目

Research on Restraining Role of New Investment Opportunity in Tunnelling Private Benefits of Control

LIU Xing¹, WU Jiang-lin¹, DOU Zhong-qiang²

1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China;
2. Chongqing Branch, China Development Bank, Chongqing 400030, China

Received:2010-10-05 Revised:2011-12-11 Online:2012-04-29 Published:2012-04-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文基于新投资机会存在假设,构建两期投资下的大股东利益侵占模型,剖析新投资机会、现金流权以及中小股东利益保护对控制权私利的影响。并结合我国上市公司控制权私利产生的背景,以2000-2008年间沪深两市A股市场发生控制权转移的上市公司为研究样本进行经验验证。研究结果表明,新投资机会与控制权私利显著负相关,新投资机会对于抑制控制权私利具有重要作用;现金流权与控制权私利水平之间存在先上升后下降的倒"U"型关系,但没有通过显著性检验;独立董事占董事会的比例与控制权私利显著不相关,再次验证了我国上市公司的独立董事制度在公司治理方面的低效性。

关键词: 新投资机会, 终极控制, 大股东侵占, 控制权私利

Abstract: Based on the given existence of new investment opportunities, this paper constructs an extended model of controlling shareholder’s expropriation to extend the classical single-term expropriation model, and analyzes theoretically the private benefits of control from the aspects of cash flow rights proportion, legal protection of mid-small shareholders and new investment return rate. According to the unique institutional context and legal environment, this paper examines empirically the theoretic results summarized formerly based on data of Chinese listed companies which controlling rights diverted in A stock markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2000-2008. The conclusions show that: it is the negative relationship between the level of private benefits of control and new investment return rate, and the increase of new investment return rate which can decrease the level of private benefits of control; we find an inverted "U"-type relationship between them through adjusting the regression model, but this conclusion is not significant; Furthermore, we examine the relation between the level of private benefits of control and legal protection of mid-small shareholders using the proportion of independent director in board of directors, and find it is not relational significant between them, once again our independent director system in corporate governance is proved non-efficient.

Key words: new investment opportunity, ultimate controlling right, large shareholder’s expropriation, private benefits of control

中图分类号:

F019

刘星, 吴江林, 豆中强. 新投资机会对大股东攫取控制权私利的影响研究 [J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, (2): 167-175.

LIU Xing, WU Jiang-lin, DOU Zhong-qiang. Research on Restraining Role of New Investment Opportunity in Tunnelling Private Benefits of Control[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, (2): 167-175.

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