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中国管理科学 ›› 2012, Vol. ›› Issue (4): 60-66.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于制销供应链产品安全责任的消费者投资决策

孟炯1, 唐小我2, 倪得兵2, 李胜3   

  1. 1. 西南科技大学经济管理学院, 四川 绵阳 621010;
    2. 电子科技大学经济与管理学院, 四川 成都 610054;
    3. 成都中医药大学管理学院, 四川 成都 611137
  • 收稿日期:2010-06-29 修回日期:2012-06-05 出版日期:2012-08-29 发布日期:2012-08-29
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70932005);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70502028);四川省科技支撑计划项目(2011FZ0008);教育部人文社会科学研究项目规划基金项目(12YJAZH092,12YJA630061);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-11-0064);西南科技大学博士基金项目(11sx7104)

Consumer’s Investment Decision Based on Product Safety Responsibility of Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chain Alliance

MENG Jiong1, TANG Xiao-wo2, NI De-bing2, LI Sheng3   

  1. 1. School of Economics Management, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang 621010, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China;
    3. University of Traditional Medicine School of Management, Chengdu 611137, China
  • Received:2010-06-29 Revised:2012-06-05 Online:2012-08-29 Published:2012-08-29

摘要: 本文运用博弈论的基本思想,从产品的安全性能(企业社会责任的一个方面)对消费者偏好的影响入手,对基于制销供应链联盟产品安全责任的消费者投资决策进行了研究。结果表明:要使g类制销联盟对履行安全责任的要求作出必要的反应,消费者应向消费者组织做出贡献,以确保g类制销联盟被选作为施压的目标;低产品安全责任满意度的消费者既不持有g类制销联盟的股票也不对消费者组织做贡献,而是选择个人捐赠产品安全事业;高产品安全责任满意度的消费者选择持有g类制销联盟的股票或者对消费者组织做贡献是对个人捐赠产品安全事业较好的替代;消费者的产品安全责任满意度与消费者是否选择持有b类制销联盟的股票无关。本文的研究成果能够对基于制销供应链联盟产品安全责任行为的消费者投资决策提供重要指导。

关键词: 制销供应链联盟, 产品安全责任, 消费者满意度, 投资决策, 博弈论

Abstract: Applying the basic idea of game theory, starting from the product safety (one perspective of the corporate social responsibilities) influence on the consumers, consumer’s investment decision base on product safety responsibility of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance is studied in this paper. The results show that in order to make g manufacturer-retailer alliance respond essentailly to the consumers’ requirement of fulfilling safety responsibilities, consumers should make contribution to the consumers’ organization in order to ensureg manufacturer-retailer alliance is targeted by the consumers’ organization. The low-σ consumer chooses to give personally to product safety causes, holds no shares in the g manufacturer-retailer alliance, and does not contribute to the the consumers’ organization. The high-σ consumer which holds shares in the g manufacturer-retailer alliance or contributes to the the consumers’ organization is a better substitute for personal giving to product safety causes. Both the low-σ and the high-σ consumers may hold shares in the b manufacturer-retailer alliance. Valuable guidances to the consumer’s investment decision base on product safety responsibility are provided in this study.

Key words: manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance, product safety responsibility, consumers’ satisfying degree, investment decision, game theory

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