基于收益共享契约的供应链质量控制与协调机制

中国管理科学 ›› 2012, Vol. ›› Issue (4): 67-73.

基于收益共享契约的供应链质量控制与协调机制

肖迪, 潘可文

浙江工商大学工商管理学院, 浙江杭州 310018

收稿日期:2011-07-23 修回日期:2012-02-08 出版日期:2012-08-29 发布日期:2012-08-29
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70902072);教育部人文社科基金资助项目(09YJC630201,10YJC630004,11YJC630159);中国博士后科学基金项目(20110491823)

Quality Control and Coordination Mechanism in Supply Chain Based on Revenue Sharing Contract

XIAO Di, PAN Ke-wen

School of Business Administration, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China

Received:2011-07-23 Revised:2012-02-08 Online:2012-08-29 Published:2012-08-29

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 研究了单个供应商和单个零售商构成的供应链中,零售商采用收益共享契约对供应链成员质量控制决策的协调作用。分析了使用收益共享契约、供应商与零售商合作、使用批发价格契约三种情况下供应链成员的博弈均衡,并进一步通过比较讨论了收益共享契约对于供应链成员质量控制的优势和局限。研究表明,当销售量的变化对产品质量改进的敏感程度较高时,收益共享契约的协调效果较好,但对于零售商来说,虽然其利润高于采用批发价格契约,可利润份额却有所下降,这意味着收益共享契约对供应商更有利。

关键词: 供应链, 质量努力, 收益共享契约

Abstract: It this paper, coordination of revenue sharing contract for quality control decision of members is studied in supply chain that consists of one supplier and one retailer. Equilibrium is analyzed in three different scenarios which include using revenue sharing contract, cooperation, and using wholesale price contract. Strength and limitation of revenue sharing contract for supply chain quality control are discussed. It shows that when the change of demand is sensitive to product quality improvement, revenue sharing contract can get better effect of coordination. Unfortunately, though retailer gets higher profit than using wholesale price contract, the share of profit decreases, which means that revenue sharing contract is more favorable for supplier.

Key words: supply chain, quality effort, revenue sharing contract

中图分类号:

F253

肖迪, 潘可文. 基于收益共享契约的供应链质量控制与协调机制[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, (4): 67-73.

XIAO Di, PAN Ke-wen. Quality Control and Coordination Mechanism in Supply Chain Based on Revenue Sharing Contract[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, (4): 67-73.

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