应对并购风险的可转债与阶段性支付模型与案例研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2012, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (5): 38-46.

应对并购风险的可转债与阶段性支付模型与案例研究

万迪昉¹, 高艳慧¹, 徐茜 ²

1. 西安交通大学管理学院, 陕西西安 710049;
2. 德勤会计师事务所,广东深圳 518000

收稿日期:2011-07-07 修回日期:2012-02-19 出版日期:2012-10-29 发布日期:2012-10-27
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目(70972101,71173166)

A Theoretical Research with Case Study of Convertible Bond and Staged Payment to M&A Risk

WAN Di-fang¹, GAO Yan-hui¹, XU Qian²

1. School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an 710049, China;
2. Deloitte, Shenzhen 518000, China

Received:2011-07-07 Revised:2012-02-19 Online:2012-10-29 Published:2012-10-27

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文运用模型研究了可转债和阶段性支付在抑制双边道德风险以及减小不确定性风险中所发挥的作用,并通过SZ能源集团并购案例详细考察了我国国有上市公司在并购过程中所存在的各种风险。结果表明,内嵌转股期权的可转债支付合约可以有效抑制并购中的双边道德风险,在阶段性支付的辅助下,则更能有效地防范市场相关风险。最后,为了更好的说明可转债和阶段性支付对于并购风险的防范作用,我们进一步通过案例分析了可转债和阶段支付的应用情况,发现阶段性支付思想已经体现在并购的现金支付方式中,但是可转债支付在国内并购中的应用尚不多见。

关键词: 可转债, 阶段性支付, 并购, 模型与案例研究

Abstract: First, the impacts of convertible bond and staged payment on controlling double-side moral hazard and reducing uncertain risk through a model are studied in this paper. Then, SZ energy group is taken for an example and M&A risk of Chinese state-owned listed company is analyzed. The result indicates that convertible bond embedded an option can retain double-sided moral hazard in M&A effectively,which, however, is weak on controlling market-related uncertain risk and convertible bond with staged payment assistant can solve this problem. At the same time, the risk of M&A in Chinese listed company and the application of convertible bond and staged pament are analyzed.

Key words: convertible bonds, staged payment, M&A, theoretical with case study

中图分类号:

C931

万迪昉, 高艳慧, 徐茜 . 应对并购风险的可转债与阶段性支付模型与案例研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, 20(5): 38-46.

WAN Di-fang, GAO Yan-hui, XU Qian. A Theoretical Research with Case Study of Convertible Bond and Staged Payment to M&A Risk[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, 20(5): 38-46.

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