针对不同类型销售商的长期激励合同设计研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2012, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (6): 118-124.

针对不同类型销售商的长期激励合同设计研究

徐鸿雁^1,2, 黄河^1,2, 陈剑³

1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆 400044;
2. 重庆大学现代物流重庆市重点实验室,重庆 400044;
3. 清华大学经济管理学院,北京 100084

收稿日期:2010-07-19 修回日期:2012-09-17 出版日期:2012-12-29 发布日期:2012-12-28
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目(71002069, 71071171, 70701040);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-11-0550);重庆市科委自然科学基金计划资助项目(CSTC2010BB0041)

Long-Term Incentive Contracts Designing on Heterogeneous Sales-agents

XU Hongyan^1,2, HUANG He^1,2, CHEN Jian³

1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;
2. Chongqing Key Laboratory of Logistics, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;
3. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Received:2010-07-19 Revised:2012-09-17 Online:2012-12-29 Published:2012-12-28

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在制造商雇用销售商销售产品的过程中,双方之间常常存在关于销售商销售能力和销售努力的不对称信息,制造商需要通过设定合同来激励销售商付出实现制造商利润最大化的销售努力。本文建立了信息不对称情况下,制造商在两周期的长期合同设计并同时制定产品价格的模型。虽然不对称信息存在时,制造商在单周期的最优合同策略是分离策略,而本文的两周期模型结果表明,长期合同中第一个周期的最优合同策略并不一定是分离策略,有可能是混同策略,这与第二周期的折现因子有关。而两周期产品价格也与单周期不同,其大于单周期采取混同策略时的价格,小于单周期采取分离策略时的价格。

关键词: 不对称信息, 激励合同, 销售能力, 销售努力

Abstract: Selling ability and effort of sales agent are always the agent’s private information when the firm sells a single product through the agent.Selling ability will determine the effectiveness of the agents’ selling efforts.In this paper, the firm needs to design incentive contracts for the agent and decide appropriate price for the product in two periods.In the model, the firm adopts long term contracts and can select two contract strategies, i.e.separating and pooling in the first period.By developing two principle-agent models, the optimal decisions for the firm in either strategy for two periods are investigated.Although the optimal contract strategy for the firm in single period is separating under asymmetric information, for two period long-term contracts, the optimal contract strategy in the first period may be separating or pooling, which depends on the discount factor.And the optimal two periods’ price is higher than the price in single period with pooling contract and is lower than the price in single period with separating contracts.

Key words: asymmetric information, incentive contracts, selling ability, sales effort

中图分类号:

F724.2

徐鸿雁, 黄河, 陈剑. 针对不同类型销售商的长期激励合同设计研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, 20(6): 118-124.

XU Hongyan, HUANG He, CHEN Jian. Long-Term Incentive Contracts Designing on Heterogeneous Sales-agents[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, 20(6): 118-124.

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