企业进入权、组织控制与跨国公司专用性投资激励

中国管理科学 ›› 2013, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (3): 169-177.

企业进入权、组织控制与跨国公司专用性投资激励

洪联英, 刘兵权, 张在美

长沙理工大学经济与管理学院, 湖南长沙 410004

收稿日期:2011-05-10 修回日期:2012-04-22 出版日期:2013-06-30 发布日期:2013-06-20
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金资助项目(11CJY095);湖南省社科基金项目(12CGA001);湖南省高校科学研究重点项目(10A008);湖南省国际经济与国际工程管理研究中心基金课题(12IEPMZ2)

Access Rights,Organization Control and the Specific-Investment Incentives of Transnational Coporations

HONG Lian-ying, LIU Bing-quan, ZHANG Zai-mei

School of Economics and Management, Changsha University of Science & Technology, Changsha 410004, China

Received:2011-05-10 Revised:2012-04-22 Online:2013-06-30 Published:2013-06-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 论文从国际生产组织控制视角,将Rajan和Zingales^[1]进入权思想融入国际生产与贸易模型中,研究跨国公司专用性投资激励问题。研究发现,在进入权的机会控制和数量调整机制作用下,跨国公司通过限制进入、替代竞争来激发当地供应商做出事前定制投资、分摊投资和事后最优专用性投资,确保获取合意投入品和预期最大化利润。当前,政府要引导外向企业致力于微观企业主体的制度建设和组织能力培养,构建起中国国际生产网络及其组织机制,为推进对外直接投资和企业国际化经营提供微观保障。

关键词: 企业进入权, 组织控制, 专用性投资, 跨国公司

Abstract: In this paper, the "access rights" theory of Rajan and Zingales^[1] and the international production and trade models are combined to study the relationship-specific investments for transnational corporations(TNC) from the perspective of production organization. It is found that TNC incentives the suppliers to provide more exante customized investment, transfer investment and optimal ex post specialization investment, which captures the suitable inputs and profit by restricting the access to suppliers and substitute competitor. The results show that China should build up China’s international production networks and its organization control mechanism to deal with this paradox of Chinese FDI and OFDI.

Key words: network access, organization control, relationship-specific investments, transnational coporations

中图分类号:

洪联英, 刘兵权, 张在美. 企业进入权、组织控制与跨国公司专用性投资激励[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(3): 169-177.

HONG Lian-ying, LIU Bing-quan, ZHANG Zai-mei. Access Rights,Organization Control and the Specific-Investment Incentives of Transnational Coporations[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2013, 21(3): 169-177.

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