奖惩机制下具竞争制造商的废旧产品回收决策模型

中国管理科学 ›› 2013, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (5): 50-56.

奖惩机制下具竞争制造商的废旧产品回收决策模型

王文宾¹, 达庆利²

1. 中国矿业大学管理学院, 江苏徐州 221116;
2. 东南大学经济管理学院, 江苏南京 211189

收稿日期:2011-03-07 修回日期:2013-06-27 出版日期:2013-10-30 发布日期:2013-10-15
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71102164);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJC630249);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2013W02);中国博士后基金项目(20110491478);2013年度徐州市社科课题基金项目(13XSA-007);江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目(2013SJD630123)

The Decision Making of Manufacturers for Collection and Remanufacturing Based on Premium and Penalty Mechanism under Competition Environment

WANG Wen-bin¹, DA Qing-li²

1. School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China

Received:2011-03-07 Revised:2013-06-27 Online:2013-10-30 Published:2013-10-15

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 各国政府为保护环境加强了对废旧电器电子产品的回收再制造的管制。本文研究了两个制造商竞争情况下基于政府奖惩机制的制造商的废旧产品回收决策问题。具体研究时分两种情况:一种情况是两个制造商中只有一个回收再制造废旧产品,另一种情况是两个制造商都回收再制造废旧产品。研究表明:奖惩机制下回收再制造废旧产品的制造商的回收率提高;无论制造商是否回收再制造废旧产品,其新产品销售价均比无奖惩机制时低,奖惩机制对消费者有利;制造商竞争有利于奖惩机制引导制造商提高废旧产品的回收率;回收率随再制造率的提高而提高;无论另一个制造商回收再制造废旧产品与否,实施回收再制造制造商的利润随奖惩力度的提高而增加,随政府规定的目标回收率的提高而降低,且奖惩力度越大,降低幅度越明显。算例分析说明了上述结论的正确性。

关键词: 竞争, 奖惩机制, 回收再制造, 回收率

Abstract: Waste product take-back is growing regulated by countries to protect the environment. The problem of collection and remanufacturing decision making based on premium and penalty mechanism is studies under manufacture competition environment in this paper. Two cases are discussed, one case is that only one manufacturer implements collection and remanufacturing,the other one is that two manufacturers implement collection and remanufacturing. Several conclusions are gained. For the manufacturer who collects and remanufactures old products, collection rate increases under premium and penalty mechanism. No matter the manufacturer collects and remanufacturers old products or not, new product's price is lower than the price without the premium and penalty mechanism. The consumer can benefit from the mechanism. The competition between manufactures is beneficial to the mechanism for leading manufacturers to increase collection rates. The collection rate increases with the remanufacturing rate. No matter the other manufacturer collects and remanufacturers old products or not, the profit of the remanufacturer who collects and remanufactures old products increases with the premium and penalty degree, and decreases with the target collection rate's increasing, furthermore, with the increase of the degree, the decrease trend become more obvious. Above conclusions are proved by the numerical analysis.

Key words: competition, premium and penalty mechanism, collection and remanufacturing, collection rate

中图分类号:

F224

王文宾, 达庆利. 奖惩机制下具竞争制造商的废旧产品回收决策模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(5): 50-56.

WANG Wen-bin, DA Qing-li. The Decision Making of Manufacturers for Collection and Remanufacturing Based on Premium and Penalty Mechanism under Competition Environment[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2013, 21(5): 50-56.

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