基于排队博弈的群体稳定性分析

中国管理科学 ›› 2013, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (5): 157-164.

基于排队博弈的群体稳定性分析

张迅, 邵扬, 张东戈

解放军理工大学指挥信息系统学院, 江苏南京 210007

收稿日期:2012-07-12 修回日期:2013-04-15 出版日期:2013-10-30 发布日期:2013-10-15
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(61174198)

An Analysis of the Group Stability Based on Queuing Game

ZHANG Xun, SHAO Yang, ZHANG Dong-ge

College of Commad Information Systems, PLA University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210007, China

Received:2012-07-12 Revised:2013-04-15 Online:2013-10-30 Published:2013-10-15

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文基于排队博弈理论得到了群体不稳定事件发生的机理和演化过程,并在分析群体中各类个体状态转化关系的基础上,建立了群体不稳定事件在自由扩散条件下和受控制条件下的状态方程。通过方程求解表明:控制实施之前不稳定单元数量会随时间成指数函数形式增长;合理调整控制响应时间、控制实施强度和控制实施时间耗费,能有效减缓或阻止群体不稳定事件的发生。

关键词: 群体性事件, 控制条件, 状态方程, 排队博弈

Abstract: The mechanism of the evolution and occurrence of the unstable events of group based on queuing game are obtained in this paper. Further, the formulas about the unstable events of group under free-spreading and controlled conditions on the basis of the analysis of the conversion among various types of individuals are established. The solution shows that the quantities of the unstable units will be in exponential growth as time goes by, and by adjusting the control of the response time, the implementation intensity and the implementation time-consuming, the unstable events of group can be alleviated or prevented efficiently.

Key words: group events, control conditions, state function, queuing game

中图分类号:

C935

张迅, 邵扬, 张东戈. 基于排队博弈的群体稳定性分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(5): 157-164.

ZHANG Xun, SHAO Yang, ZHANG Dong-ge. An Analysis of the Group Stability Based on Queuing Game[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2013, 21(5): 157-164.

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