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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2013, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (6): 57-63.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

奖惩机制下制造商竞争的闭环供应链决策模型

王文宾1, 陈琴1, 达庆利2   

  1. 1. 中国矿业大学管理学院, 江苏 徐州 221116;
    2. 东南大学经济管理学院, 江苏 南京 211189
  • 收稿日期:2012-06-27 修回日期:2013-01-13 出版日期:2013-12-29 发布日期:2013-12-23
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目（71102164）；教育部人文社会科学研究项目（10YJC630249）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金（2013W02）；中国博士后基金项目（20110491478）；江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目（2013SJD630123）

Decision and Analysis of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Manufacturer-Led and Manufacturer-Compete Based on the Reward-Penalty Mechanism

WANG Wen-bin1, CHEN Qin1, DA Qing-li2   

  1. 1. School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
  • Received:2012-06-27 Revised:2013-01-13 Online:2013-12-29 Published:2013-12-23

PDF (PC)

1815

被引次数

18

摘要： 本文分别建立了集中式决策，无奖惩机制的分散式决策以及奖惩机制下考虑制造商竞争的闭环供应链决策模型。通过逆向归纳法对三种情况下决策变量的求解与比较，分别得到了闭环供应链的回购价、批发价、零售价及回收率。研究表明：与无奖惩机制下的分散式决策情形相比，政府奖惩机制能有效引导制造商降低新产品价格、提高回收率、增加闭环供应链各成员企业的利润，同时有利于增加消费者的利益；奖惩机制下主动回收废旧产品的制造商利润增加，不回收的制造商利润降低，有效引导了制造商的回收积极性，同时回收商与零售商利润的增加也提高了她们参与闭环供应链的积极性，进而使得整个闭环供应链的成员企业有效协调。

关键词: 制造商竞争, 闭环供应链, 回收, 奖惩机制

Abstract: In this paper, the centralized decision-making model, the decentralized decision-making model of the non-Reward-Penalty Mechanism as well as the closed-loop supply chain models, which considers competitions of manufactore and is based on the Reward-Penalty Mechanism, have been established. By solving and comparing the results of these models with the method of backward induction respectively, the buyback price, wholesale price, retail price and collection decisions of closed-loop supply chain have been obtained. Studies have shown that: compared with the decentralized decision-making under the non-Reward-Penalty Mechanism, the government's Reward-Penalty Mechanism not only can effectively guide manufacturers to reduce the price of new products, improve the collection rate and improve the efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain but also is conducive to the increasing of the profits of the closed-loop supply chain members; Reward-Penalty Mechanism make the recycling manufacturer's profits increased, and the non-recycling manufacturer's profits decreased, which can guide the manufacturer's enthusiasm of collection and remanufacturing effectively; meanwhile, the increase of the recyclers' and the retailers' profits can also arouse their enthusiasm, and then make the whole closed-loop supply chain members' harmonious operation.

Key words: manufacturer-compete, closed-loop supply chain, collection rate, the Reward-Penalty Mechnanism

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