基于增发新股交易操纵的国内承销商声誉模型

中国管理科学 ›› 2013, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (6): 177-184.

基于增发新股交易操纵的国内承销商声誉模型

邹晓峰¹, 傅强²

1. 贵州财经大学金融学院, 贵州贵阳 550004;
2. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400044

收稿日期:2011-06-22 修回日期:2012-08-23 出版日期:2013-12-29 发布日期:2013-12-23
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71061003）

China Underwriter’s Reputation in the SEO：Based on the Traded-based Manipulation

ZOU Xiao-feng¹, FU Qiang²

1. Finance School, Guizhou University of economics and finance, Guiyang 550004, China;
2. School of economics and business administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 4000301, China

Received:2011-06-22 Revised:2012-08-23 Online:2013-12-29 Published:2013-12-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 市场制度是国内承销商声誉认证失效的直观原因，也是国内承销商交易操纵的重要因素。为分析制度因素和交易操纵对国内承销商声誉形成的影响，本文建立了增发新股中的国内承销商声誉模型，以考察承销商声誉形成过程。结果表明，增发新股中交易操纵使得国内承销商声誉认证失效，一种是一致失职的恶性状态，另一种是类似蛛网理论的恶性循环，高声誉承销商不重视声誉而失职、低声誉注重声誉反而尽职，这与美国声誉认证效应完全相反。模型结果为国内承销商声誉认证失效提供新的模型解释，也为监管层提供建立国内承销商声誉机制的途径。

关键词: 承销商, 交易操纵, 声誉认证, 尽职调查, 增发新股

Abstract: The domestic market system is not only the instinct reason of the invalidation of the underwriter's reputation certification in China, but also the key factor of China underwriter's traded-based manipulation. In this paper, a model about China underwriter's reputation is set up to analysis the reputation formation and the impact of the traded-based manipulation and the system factor. The set up results indicate that the SEO traded-based manipulation makes China underwriter's certification invalid. One bad state is the consistency of the delinquency, another is a vicious circle similar to the cobweb theory, that the lower underwriter incline to due diligence instead, completely different form the mature market's certification effect. So that a new model is given for the invalidation of the underwriter reputation certification effect in China, and at the same time the governors can perfect the domestic underwriter's reputation mechanism.

Key words: underwriter, traded-based manipulation, reputation certification, due diligence report, seasoned equity offering(SEO)

中图分类号:

邹晓峰, 傅强. 基于增发新股交易操纵的国内承销商声誉模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(6): 177-184.

ZOU Xiao-feng, FU Qiang. China Underwriter’s Reputation in the SEO：Based on the Traded-based Manipulation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2013, 21(6): 177-184.

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