具公平关切零售商的闭环供应链差别定价策略研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (3): 51-58.

具公平关切零售商的闭环供应链差别定价策略研究

张克勇¹, 吴燕¹, 侯世旺²

1. 中北大学经济与管理学院, 山西太原 030051;
2. 中北大学机械工程与自动化学院, 山西太原 030051

收稿日期:2012-09-14 修回日期:2013-07-29 出版日期:2014-03-20 发布日期:2014-03-19
作者简介:张克勇（1972- ），男（汉族），湖南溆浦人，中北大学经济管理学院副教授，硕士生导师，博士，研究方向：生产运营管理、物流与供应链管理.
基金资助:
教育部青年基金项目（13YJC630049）；中国博士后科学基金资助项目（2011M501272）；中北大学校科学基金资助项目（2011-56）

Differential Pricing Strategy of Considering Retailer’s Fairness Concerns in the Closed-Loop Supply Chain

ZHANG Ke-yong¹, WU Yan¹, HOU Shi-wang²

1. School of Economics and Management, North University of China, Taiyuan 030051, China;
2. School of Mechanical engineering and Automation, North University of China, Taiyuan 030051, China

Received:2012-09-14 Revised:2013-07-29 Online:2014-03-20 Published:2014-03-19

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 将零售商公平关切行为倾向引入到闭环供应链的差别定价策略中，构建了制造商考虑和不考虑零售商公平关切行为两种差别定价决策模型，运用博弈理论对两种模型进行分析求解。研究表明闭环供应链成员的差别定价策略、收益以及废旧产品回收量均受到零售商公平关切行为的影响；制造商应考虑零售商的公平关切行为倾向做出决策，这对制造商自身是有利的，同时也增加了对废旧产品的回收量，有利于资源回收再利用；同时还发现公平关切行为倾向是零售商获取闭环供应链系统利润分配的一种有效手段，同时这种公平关切行为倾向会造成闭环供应链系统效率的损失。

关键词: 闭环供应链, 公平关切, 差别定价, stackelberg博弈

Abstract: In this paper, differential price strategies of the closed-loop supply chain for considering fairness concerns behavior are studied, and two different price models are constructed under two different situations in which the manufacturer considers retailer's behavior of fairness concerns or the manufacturer doesn't consider retailer's behavior of fairness concerns. Differential price models are analyzed by game theory. The results show that the retailer's fairness concerns behavior tendencies affect to some degree the differential price strategies as well as the profits of the retailer and manufacturer, and the end-of-life recycling quantity. The manufacturer makes more benefits when he considers the retailer's behavior of fairness concerns than he doesn't, and so on its will increase the amount of recycling waste products of the closed-loop supply chain system and in favor of resource recycling and reusing when the retailer is fairness concerns. The study shows that the behavior of fairness concerns is an effective measure for the retailer to obtain the channel distribution of gains, but the efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain decreases at the same time.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, fairness concerns, differential pricing, stackelberg game

中图分类号:

F274

张克勇, 吴燕, 侯世旺. 具公平关切零售商的闭环供应链差别定价策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(3): 51-58.

ZHANG Ke-yong, WU Yan, HOU Shi-wang. Differential Pricing Strategy of Considering Retailer’s Fairness Concerns in the Closed-Loop Supply Chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(3): 51-58.

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