基于风险偏好下的网上在线拍卖策略设计

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (3): 96-102.

基于风险偏好下的网上在线拍卖策略设计

丁黎黎¹, 徐寅峰², 刘新民¹

1. 山东科技大学经济管理学院, 山东青岛 266590;
2. 西安交通大学管理学院, 陕西西安 710049

收稿日期:2011-12-14 修回日期:2012-12-11 出版日期:2014-03-20 发布日期:2014-03-19
作者简介:丁黎黎（1978- ），女（汉族），山东五莲人，山东科技大学经济管理学院，副教授，硕士生导师，研究方向：在线拍卖策略设计.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71371111，71373247）；青岛社科规划项目（QDSKL130422）；山东科技大学杰出青年和创新团队项目（2011KYJQ103，2011KYTD104）

On-line Auction Strategies on the Internet Based on Risk Preference

DING Li-li¹, XU Yin-feng², LIU Xin-min¹

1. School of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China;
2. School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, China

Received:2011-12-14 Revised:2012-12-11 Online:2014-03-20 Published:2014-03-19

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对占线拍卖问题（on-line auction problem）的卖方策略进行了研究，扩展了传统占线拍卖机制中拍卖人风险规避态度的假设，构建了基于风险偏好的风险回报分析框架。进一步，为拍卖人设计了RPS拍卖策略和MPS拍卖策略，结论显示这两种拍卖策略使得拍卖人可以根据自己的风险偏好和对未来的预期进行拍卖数量、拍卖价格的选择，而且两种拍卖策略的竞争性能比优于传统竞争分析框架下的结果。数值算例的分析表明，在风险回报分析框架下，拍卖人的风险忍耐度与拍卖策略的收益成正比。分析还显示，设置多个预期参考价格可以增强拍卖人预测能力，从而提高拍卖策略收益。

关键词: 占线拍卖, 竞争性能比, 风险, 回报

Abstract: The seller's strategies of the on-line auction problem are studied in this paper. Traditional assumption that sellers are always risk averse is extended and a risk reward framework is established based on risk preference. Two auction strategies of RPS and MPS are designed for the risk taking sellers. The analyses show that the competitive ratios of these two strategies are lower than one of the traditional strategy, and they can achieve better performance. It proves that the risk preference and forecasts determine the auction quantities and auction prices. Finally, numerical examples show that risk tolerance and auction reward are positive. Furthermore, multiple forecasts on reference prices can improve the sellers' forecasting ability and increase auction reward.

Key words: on-line auction, competitive ratio, risk, reward

中图分类号:

F713

丁黎黎, 徐寅峰, 刘新民. 基于风险偏好下的网上在线拍卖策略设计[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(3): 96-102.

DING Li-li, XU Yin-feng, LIU Xin-min. On-line Auction Strategies on the Internet Based on Risk Preference[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(3): 96-102.

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