突发水灾害应急合作的行为博弈模型研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (4): 92-97.

突发水灾害应急合作的行为博弈模型研究

张乐^1,2, 王慧敏^1,2, 佟金萍^1,3

1. 河海大学水文水资源与水利工程科学国家重点实验室, 江苏南京 210098;
2. 河海大学管理科学研究所,江苏南京 210098;
3. 常州大学经济管理学院,江苏常州 213164

收稿日期:2012-01-12 修回日期:2012-12-14 出版日期:2014-04-20 发布日期:2014-04-23
作者简介:张乐（1985- ），男（汉族），河南人，河海大学水文水资源与水利工程科学国家重点实验室，博士研究生，研究方向：水灾害应急管理.
基金资助:
国家社科基金重大项目（12&ZD214）；国家自然科学重大培育项目（90924027）；国家重点基础研究发展计划（973计划）（2010CB951104）；水利部公益性项目（201001044）；云南省科技厅计划项目（2010CA013）；江苏省研究生创新计划（CXLX11_0464）

Behavioral Game Research of Emergency Management Cooperation for Unexpected Water Disaster

ZHANG Le^1,2, WANG Hui-min^1,2, TONG Jin-ping^1,3

1. State Key Laboratory of Hydrology Water Resource and Hydraulic Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098, China;
2. Management Science Institute, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098, China;
3. School of Economics and Management, Changzhou University, Changzhou 213164, China

Received:2012-01-12 Revised:2012-12-14 Online:2014-04-20 Published:2014-04-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文针对突发水灾害应急管理中的多主体合作问题进行了探讨。运用博弈论和数值仿真方法，引入合作效用概念，基于收益不确定下的蜈蚣博弈实验模型构建了突发水灾害应急管理中异质性主体的合作行为博弈模型；在此基础上深入探讨了合作效用变量对突发水灾害应急管理中达成合作可能性的影响；并通过算例进行了数值分析。

关键词: 突发水灾害, 蜈蚣博弈, 合作效用, 合作行动空间

Abstract: The cooperation behavior within multi-agents is discussed at the background of the emergency management for unexpected water disasters in this paper. Firstly, Cooperative utility is proposed, and the cooperative model with heterogeneity agents is constructed based on the experimental model of centipede game with uncertainty payoffs. Further, in emergency management for unespected water disaster, the influence that utility of cooperation variables may esert on the cooperation possibility is deeply studied. Finally, through an illustration, the propositions from this paper are testified.

Key words: water disaster, centipede game, utility of cooperation, collective action area of cooperation

中图分类号:

C931

张乐, 王慧敏, 佟金萍. 突发水灾害应急合作的行为博弈模型研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(4): 92-97.

ZHANG Le, WANG Hui-min, TONG Jin-ping. Behavioral Game Research of Emergency Management Cooperation for Unexpected Water Disaster[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(4): 92-97.

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