考虑政府引导激励的电子废弃物回收处理决策模型研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (5): 131-137.

考虑政府引导激励的电子废弃物回收处理决策模型研究

余福茂¹, 钟永光², 沈祖志³

1. 杭州电子科技大学管理学院, 浙江杭州 310018;
2. 青岛大学管理科学与工程系, 山东青岛 266071;
3. 浙江大学管理学院, 浙江杭州 310058

收稿日期:2012-06-21 修回日期:2013-05-08 出版日期:2014-05-20 发布日期:2014-05-14
作者简介:余福茂（1975-），男（汉族），山西应县人，杭州电子科技大学管理学院副教授，博士，研究方向：逆向物流、资源环境政策与管理.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（70903021，71273149，71373064）；浙江省高校“决策科学与创新管理”人文社科重点研究基地课题（RWSKZD03-201202）；山东省优秀中青年科学家科研奖励基金（BS2010SF008）

Decision Model on E-waste Collecting and Recycling Considering the Leading of Government’s Premium Mechanisms

YU Fu-mao¹, ZHONG Yong-guang², SHEN Zu-zhi³

1. College of management, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou 310018, China;
2. Department of Management Science and Engineering, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China;
3. College of management, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China

Received:2012-06-21 Revised:2013-05-08 Online:2014-05-20 Published:2014-05-14

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文主要讨论政府引导激励下的电子废弃物回收处理决策模型。结合实践情况把电子废弃物回收处理归纳为四种模式，建立了相应模式下考虑回收补贴激励的决策模型，并讨论了其最优参数。研究表明：四种模式下的电子电器产品最优零售价及市场需求量均相等；当补贴额度不变时，生产商回收理模式下的电子废弃物回收率以及各主体收益与补贴对象无关；若赋予生产商一定的回收责任，则经销商回收和第三方回收模式下的回收率均高于生产商回收模式。数值分析表明，理论上并不存在绝对占优的电子废弃物回收模式，实施生产者责任延伸下的专业处理企业回收模式可达到较高的回收率，建议从制度、对象和过程等角度完善对相关回收主体的引导激励机制。

关键词: 电子废弃物, 回收处理, 政府补贴, 激励机制

Abstract: Most of e-waste have not been recycled and reused in an environment-friendly manner in China mainland, and there are mainly four kinds of collecting and recycling modes: manufacturers collecting (MDC-CMR), dealers collecting (MDC-CDR), third-party collecting (MDC-CTR) and registered e-waste treatment enterprises collecting (MDC-CR). Based on the practical situation, the decision-making problem about the e-waste collecting and recycling considering the leading of government's premium mechanisms is studied in this paper. Four collecting and recycling scenarios are discussed considering the government subsidy, decision models are established and the optimal parameters of the mechanism are discussed accordingly. It is found that the optimal retail price and the market demand of EEE in the four modes are equal. With the same amount of subsidies, the recycling rate of MDC-CMR mode as well as manufacturers, dealers and registered recyclers' profit does not change with government's premium mechanisms. It is also found that MDC-CDR mode and MDC-CTR mode are more desirable than MDC-CMR mode if given the manufacturer responsibility for collecting and recycling. Results of numerical simulations also shown that, the combination of EPR and MDC-CTR can achieve higher recycling rate. Therefore, it is suggested to encourage manufactures, dealers, consumers, and other collectors and recyclers to participate e-waste recycling program from the perspective of system, objectives and processes.

Key words: e-waste, recycling and processing, government subsidies, premium mechanism

中图分类号:

F224.9
C934

余福茂, 钟永光, 沈祖志. 考虑政府引导激励的电子废弃物回收处理决策模型研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(5): 131-137.

YU Fu-mao, ZHONG Yong-guang, SHEN Zu-zhi. Decision Model on E-waste Collecting and Recycling Considering the Leading of Government’s Premium Mechanisms[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(5): 131-137.

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