非对称成本扰动信息非线性需求函数下的供应链契约设计

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (8): 80-89.

非对称成本扰动信息非线性需求函数下的供应链契约设计

黄松¹, 杨超²

1. 华南农业大学经济管理学院, 广东广州 510642;
2. 华中科技大学管理学院, 湖北武汉 430074

收稿日期:2013-01-21 修回日期:2013-09-02 出版日期:2014-08-20 发布日期:2014-08-23
作者简介:黄松（1982- ），男（汉族），湖北武汉人，华南农业大学经济管理学院，讲师，博士，研究方向：物流与供应链管理.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71301055）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目（13YJC630054）

Contracting with Asymmetric Production Cost Disruption Information under Nonlinear Demand Function

HUANG Song¹, YANG Chao²

1. College of Economics & Management, South China Agricultural University, Guangzhou 510642, China;
2. School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China

Received:2013-01-21 Revised:2013-09-02 Online:2014-08-20 Published:2014-08-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了分析非对称的成本扰动信息对于供应链契约设计的影响，研究了当制造商的成本发生扰动并且扰动信息是非对称的情形下的零售商的最优契约设计问题。假定市场需求是关于价格的非线性函数，使用委托-代理理论，设计了非对称的成本扰动信息下的供应链最优契约菜单，并且分析了非对称的扰动信息对于供应链绩效的影响。研究结果表明，当需求为常数柔性函数或者指数函数形式时，可以设计有效的契约菜单来改善供应链的绩效；在非对称的成本扰动信息下，当生产成本扰动满足一定条件时，初始的生产计划仍然是最优的；非对称的成本扰动信息并不必然会给供应链带来利润损失。最后通过数值算例对模型的结果进行了验证。

关键词: 扰动管理, 非对称信息, 契约设计, 非线性需求

Abstract: To analyze the impact of asymmetric disruption information on the supply chain contract design, the optimal contract design problem is investigated when the manufacturer experiences production cost disruption and the production cost disruption information is asymmetric. Based on the assumption that the market demand is nonlinearly determined by the retail price, by utilizing the principal-agent theory, the optimal contract menus under asymmetric production cost disruption information are derived. And the impact of asymmetric production cost disruption information on the supply chain performance is analyzed. It is found that appropriate contract menus can be devised to improve the supply chain performance when the market demand takes the form of exponential function or constant-elasticity function. Under asymmetric production cost disruption, the original production plan is still optimal under some specific conditions. And the asymmetry of production cost disruption does not necessarily lead to profit loss for the supply chain. At last, some numerical examples are given to verify the results obtained this paper. These results will help to improve the operation efficiency of the supply chain under asymmetric production cost disruption scenario.

Key words: disruption management, asymmetric information, contract design, nonlinear demand

中图分类号:

F224.3

黄松, 杨超. 非对称成本扰动信息非线性需求函数下的供应链契约设计[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(8): 80-89.

HUANG Song, YANG Chao. Contracting with Asymmetric Production Cost Disruption Information under Nonlinear Demand Function[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(8): 80-89.

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