具有公平感的零售商订购决策研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 供应链系统中，零售商的公平感知会对其订购决策产生影响。将公平感细分为四类：过程双边公平、结果双边公平、过程单边公平和结果单边公平，研究了具有不同公平感类型的零售商在批发价合同下的订购决策。第一，在批发价合同中，具有过程或结果双边公平感的零售商，其订购量各不相同，与不考虑公平感的零售商的相对大小关系取决于系统参数；并且，零售商的公平感无法协调系统，但在某些条件下，可以改善其在系统中的相对收益。第二，在批发价合同中，具有过程或结果单边公平感的零售商，若零售商关注过程单边公平，其订购量总小于不具有公平感的零售商的；若零售商关注结果单边公平，在某些条件下，其订购量大于不具有公平感的零售商的；并且，零售商的公平感无法协调系统，但在某些条件下，可以改善其在系统中的相对收益。

关键词: 过程双边公平, 结果双边公平, 过程单边公平, 结果单边公平

Abstract: The retailer's fairness concerning influences the ordering decision in the supply chain. Types of fairness are divided as: two-sides process fairness, two-sides outcome fairness, one-side process fairness and one-side outcome fairness. In this paper, how fairness concerning influences the retailer's optimal ordering decisions under wholesale price contract is investigated. Firstly, given the wholesale price contract, when the retailer concerns about two-sides fairness, the optimal ordering decision under process fairness is different from that under outcome fairness. The comparison of the optimal ordering decisions between that with fairness concerning and that without depends on the system's parameters. His fairness concerning cannot coordinate the supply chain, but it can improve his relative profits under some conditions. Secondly, given the wholesale price contract, when the retailer concerns about one-side fairness, the optimal ordering decision with process fairness is smaller than that without and the optimal ordering decision with outcome fairness is larger than that without under some conditions. His fairness concerning cannot coordinate the supply chain, but he can improve his relative profits under some conditions.

Key words: two-sides process fairness, two-sides outcome fairness, one-side process fairness, one-side outcome fairness

中图分类号:

C931
F253

李娟, 张迪, 沈厚才. 具有公平感的零售商订购决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(8): 90-99.

LI Juan, ZHANG Di, SHEN Hou-cai. Fairness’s Influences to the Retailer’s Ordering Decision[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(8): 90-99.

参考文献

[1] Guth W, Schmittberger R, Schwarze B. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1982, 4(3): 367-388.
[2] Berg J, Dickaut J, McCabe K. Trust, reciprocity and social history[J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 10: 122-42.
[3] Kahneman D, Knetsch J L, Thaler R H. Fairness and the assumptions of economics[J]. Journal of Business, 1986, 59: 285-300.
[4] 每台ipad苹果劲赚150美元,中国工人工资仅8美元[EB/OL].[2012-02-15].环球网:http://www.huanqiu.com/roll/2012-02/2440233.html.
[5] Fehr E, Schmidt K M. A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999,114: 817-868.
[6] Bolton G E, Ockenfels A. ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition[J]. The American Economic Review, 2000, 90(1): 166-193.
[7] Charness G, Rabin M. Understanding social preferences with simple tests[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002,117(3): 817-869.
[8] Loch C H, Wu Yaozhong. Social preferences and supply chain performance: An experimental study[J]. Management Science, 2008, 54(11): 1835-1849.
[9] Pavlov V, Katok E. Fairness and coordination failures in supply chain[R]. Working paper, The Pennsylvania State University,2010.
[10] Thibaut J W, Walker L. Procedural justice: A psychological analysis[M]. New York: L.Erbaum Associates, 1975.
[11] Lind E A, Tyler T R. The social psychology of procedural justice[M]. New York: Plenum Press, 1988.
[12] Tyler T R, Blader S L. The group-engagement model: procedural justice, social dentity, and cooperative behavior[J]. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2003,7(4): 349-361.
[13] McFarlin D B, Sweeney P D. Distributive and procedural justice as predictors of satisfaction with personal and organizational outcomes[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1992, 35 (3): 626 - 637.
[14] Camerer C F, Ho T H, Chong J K.Behavioral game theory: thinking, learning and teaching[R].Working paper, National University of Singapore,2001.
[15] Kahneman D. Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics[J]. The American Economic Review, 2003, 93(5): 1449-1475.
[16] Luong H T, Phien N H.Measure of bullwhip effect in supply chains: The case of high order autoregressive demand process[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2007,183(1): 197-209.
[17] Cui Haitao, Raju J S, Zhang Z J. Faireness and channel coordination[J]. Management Science, 2007, 53(8):1303-1314.
[18] Ozgun C D, Chen Youhua Jianbin, Li J B.Channel coordination under fairness concerns and nonlinear demand[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 207(1): 1321-1326.
[19] Chen J G, Hu Q Y, Song J S. Altruism and supply chain performance[R]. Working paper, Duke University,2012.
[20] Rotemberg J J. Human relations in the workplace[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1994,102(4): 684-717.
[21] Wu Xiaole, Niederhoff J. Fairness in selling to the newsvendor[R]. Working paper, Fudan University,2012.
[22] 杜少甫, 杜婵, 梁樑, 等. 考虑公平关切的供应链契约与协调[J]. 管理科学学报,2010, 13(11): 41-48.
[23] Karlin S. Total positivity[M]. Catifornia:Stanford University Press,1968.
[24] Anupindi R, Bassok Y, Zemel E. A general framework for the study of decentralized distribution[J]. Manufacturing Service operations management, 2001,3(4):340-368.
[25] Schweitzer M E, Cachon G P. Decision bias in the newsvendor problem with a known demand distribution: Experimental evidence[J]. Management Science, 2000,46(3):404-420.
[26] Macneil I R. The new social contract: An inquiry into modern contractual relations[M]. New Haven,CT:Yale University Press,1980.
[27] Frazier G L. Interorganizational exchange behavior in marketing channels: A broadened perspective[J]. Marketing, 1983,47(4):68-78.